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1. Introduction 
Most resource allocation in the economy takes place within firms, not within markets 
(Matvos and Seru, 2014). Allocation of capital within firms is not limited to one industry. 
Diversified firms spanning several industries represent a large share of firms within the United 
States, as well as the rest of the world. Changing the scope of these firms can therefore 
substantially alter the allocation of capital across industries. In the U.S., the scope of firms has 
undergone significant changes over time. The average number of segments in a diversified firm 
during the early 1980s was 2.4, so a typical conglomerate would reallocate capital across 2.4 
two-digit SIC industries. By the early 1990s this number had decreased to 1.6, and again 
increased during the recent crisis. We argue that the scope of firms did not undergo these 
changes in isolation; changes in firm scope moved with changes in external capital market 
frictions. For example, the TED spread,1 a popular measure of external market frictions, also 
fluctuated significantly over the same decades, exceeding 1.5% in the early 1980s, declining to 
below 0.5% by early 1990s, and again increasing during the recent crisis. This paper 
systematically documents this connection between evolution of firm scope and changes in 
frictions in external capital markets over the last three decades. 
We find that firms increase their scope during times of high external capital market 
frictions, such as in the recent Great Recession. Moreover, during these times, firms diversify 
their investment needs and cash flows across industries. We find these patterns in the scope of 
large, publicly traded firms, as well as in the mergers and acquisitions activity of standalone and 
                                                          
1 The TED spread is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-bills. It is used as a conventional gauge of credit risk, which banks pass through to the real sector (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin, 2008). Matvos and Seru (2014) show that capital allocation in diversified firms responds to the TED spread. 
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diversified, private as well as public firms. This evidence is consistent with the notion that firms 
diversify their scope in response to tightening in external capital markets. 
We build on the recent literature, which has shown that diversified firms are better able to 
weather freezes in financial markets due to reallocation of capital inside these firms (Matvos and 
Seru, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015; Almeida, Kim and Kim, 2015). Our results 
suggest that firms respond to incentives to increase and diversify their scope during times of 
external market distress, further reducing the impact of financial market freezes. More broadly, 
our findings imply that capital intermediation activity shifts within firms as financial 
intermediation within markets breaks down, illustrating that transaction costs in markets 
determine firm boundaries in the spirit of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975). 
The framework guiding our empirical analysis is the idea that firm incentives to diversify 
increase with external capital market frictions. As external markets tighten, a standalone firm 
cannot take advantage of good investment opportunities if it lacks internal financing. A 
conglomerate, on the other hand, can more easily take advantage by reducing investment in 
other, less productive parts of the firm (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 
2015). As frictions in external capital markets increase, capital allocation in internal capital 
markets becomes more attractive, providing incentives for firms to increase their scope. 
Intuitively, increased diversification increases the likelihood that a good investment opportunity 
in one division is contemporaneous with a low investment opportunity another division. 
Therefore the benefits of diversification should be highest when conglomerates are more 
diversified, i.e. when the correlation of productivity shocks across segments is low. Finally, one 
would expect such benefits from diversification to increase with the persistence of shocks to the 
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financial markets.2  In the rest of the paper we empirically explore whether firms respond to 
incentives to increase and diversify their scope during times of external market distress.  
We find that conglomerates add segments as TED, our measure of external market 
frictions, increases. This result is robust to standard controls, as well as firm fixed effects, which 
significantly alleviates the concerns that it is the composition of firms in our sample which 
explains the changes in scope. Because more diversified conglomerates benefit more during 
times of external capital market stress, we expect firms to respond by becoming more diversified 
during such times. We confirm that as TED increases, conglomerates’ assets and sales become 
more diversified across industries, even after we account for firm fixed effects.  
To establish a tighter link with capital allocation, which is the driving force in our 
framework, we examine whether diversification across industries indeed leads to diversification 
of investment opportunities. As TED increases, conglomerates shift their assets to industries 
whose investment is less correlated. We also find that the cash flows and financing deficits 
produced by different divisions become more diversified.  Jointly, the results suggest that 
conglomerates find diversification in times of external market dislocation valuable and adjust 
their structure to promote capital allocation across divisions.  
In the second part of the paper, we study whether the patterns we find extend beyond 
conglomerates. Specifically, we study transactions that are used by firms to undertake large 
changes in scope, i.e. mergers and acquisitions (see Erel, Jang, and Weisbach, 2015, for the 
relationship between financial constraints and M&A). An additional advantage of studying 
mergers is that it exposes our tests to a different sample of firms, comprising standalone as well 
as diversified firms, both private as well as public.  
                                                          2 These predictions are formalized in a simple model presented in the Appendix. 
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We first examine aggregate merger activity. Aggregate merger activity varies over time, 
giving rise to well documented merger waves (e.g. Harford, 2005). We document that the 
aggregate composition of mergers also significantly fluctuates over time: periods of diversifying 
mergers are followed by periods in which focused mergers dominate, and vice versa. Before 
1990, the majority of deals (value weighted) were diversifying. The share of diversifying 
mergers dropped below 40% in 1990s, and again exceeded 50% during the Great Recession. If 
diversification is beneficial during times of external market distress, then we would expect 
diversifying mergers to be more appealing than focused mergers during these times. We find that 
the share of diversifying mergers is highly correlated with our measure of external capital market 
frictions, TED. In other words, diversification activity is closely correlated with fluctuations in 
external market frictions.  
We observe similar aggregate patterns in diversification activity over time, if we measure 
diversification on dimensions linked to capital reallocation. We observe aggregate diversification 
patterns in correlation of cash flows, investments, and financing deficits between the industries 
of acquirers and targets. As financial market distortions increase, acquirers are more likely to 
acquire targets that are less correlated on each of these dimensions.  
To show that these aggregate patterns in diversification activity over time are not driven 
by changes in firms’ composition, we analyze individual merger deals. We first confirm that a 
given merger is more likely to be diversifying in times of high TED, even when we condition on 
the characteristics of the target and the acquirer, as well as acquirers and targets industries. 
Therefore, our results are not driven by the correlation of acquisition activity of different 
industries with aggregate conditions. These results are robust across several different samples 
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and specifically outside of large diversified public firms whose choices of scope we examine in 
the first part of the paper.  
We next examine whether changes in firms’ scope from diversifying mergers are related 
to capital reallocation, which drives diversification in our framework. We use deal-level data to 
confirm that diversifying mergers result in more diversified investment opportunities, cash flows, 
and financing deficits for the merged firm. As TED increases, so does the likelihood that the 
target is from an industry whose investment, cash flows, or financing deficits are less correlated 
with the industry of the acquirer, even after conditioning on the acquirer and target industries. 
These results mirror those we find in conglomerates despite being estimated on a substantially 
different sample. 
Changing organizational structure is likely costly. A focused firm does not become 
extremely diversified one year, and switch back to being focused the next year. In light of such 
slow adjustments of organizational structure, how do we interpret the effect of dislocations in 
external capital markets on firms’ organizational structure? Our framework suggests that the 
benefit of diversifying is proportional to the persistence of external capital market conditions. 
We use several tests to show that dislocations in external capital markets are somewhat 
persistent, which increases organizations’ incentives to adjust their scope. We show that a 
component of TED, which is more long lived, leads to adjustment in the organizational structure 
rather than extreme spikes in the TED spread, which are very short lived. We then use a VAR 
approach, we estimate substantial levels of persistence in TED and organizational structure, with 
a shock to TED affecting firms’ scope with a half-life of about ten years.  
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Last, we study the type of compensation used in merger or acquisition. In cash mergers, 
the acquirer buys target shares from target shareholders with cash. A stock merger, on the other 
hand, does not require cash outlays. If outside funds are scarce, then decreasing the amount of 
cash would not be appealing and we should expect more stock mergers. Our results confirm the 
conjecture, finding that cash mergers are less likely during times of high TED.  
Our findings are robust to several alternative choices of sample and specifications. In 
particular, we find similar results if we exclude the recent financial crisis, NBER recessions, and 
periods of extreme values of TED. We find similar results if we measure external market 
frictions using BAA-AAA and EBP spread instead of the TED spread. Consistent with our 
framework, the sensitivity of firm scope to TED is also higher in more volatile industries. 
Finally, we also conduct an additional test using bank deregulation as a shock to external supply 
of credit to help identify the effects more cleanly. The results from this analysis provide 
additional support for our main findings.  
Overall, we provide broad evidence suggesting that firms adjust their organizational 
structure in response to changes in external capital markets. The benefits of capital reallocation 
are highest when one firm has excess funds, which it does not need for investment, while another 
firm needs external funds to finance its internal shortfall. Standalone firms achieve reallocation 
through financial markets. One firm saves excess funds, for example in a bank, while another 
firm borrows these funds from the same bank. When external markets tighten, capital 
reallocation within a firm becomes more valuable, especially among divisions whose investment 
opportunities, cash flows, and financing deficits are less correlated. Our evidence is consistent 
with firms adjusting their scope in order to take better advantage of internal capital markets, 
implying that capital intermediation activity shifts within firms when intermediation in financial 
 7  
markets becomes difficult. While the evidence in the paper is consistent with this interpretation, 
there may be other alternative interpretations that may also be consistent with these patterns. 
Our results imply that firms’ choice of scope can partially offset financial intermediation 
shocks. Capital reallocation within diversified firms provides an (imperfect) substitute for 
intermediation activity in markets. Our evidence suggests that as financial markets freeze, firms 
respond by expanding their scope to facilitate intermediation within the firm. Creating internal 
capital markets more capable of reallocation additionally dampens the negative consequences of 
frictions in external capital markets.  
Our findings suggest that agency problems may not be the only driving force behind 
diversifying mergers, which has been the leading hypothesis heretofore. The simple fact that 
external financial market frictions are correlated with bad times suggests that the patterns in 
diversification that we identify are not likely driven by agency problems. For example, if 
diversifying mergers are a symptom of empire building (Jensen, 1989), then one would expect 
them to dominate in good times, when firms are flush with cash and external capital markets are 
loose. Instead, we find that times of high external market distress are periods of expanding firm 
scope. 
The basic idea that firms increase their scope when transactions in markets are more 
costly goes back to Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975). Our predictions extend beyond this 
basic insight that changes in transaction costs bring more activity into the firm. We link the 
benefit of internal capital markets -- when external markets are stressed -- to the benefits of 
capital reallocation, and link these to dispersion in investment opportunities and cash flows in the 
firm. We then confirm our predictions in the data. 
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Our paper is most closely related to the recent literature, which has shown that diversified 
firms are better able to weather freezes in financial markets due to reallocation of capital inside 
these firms (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015; Almeida, Kim and 
Kim, 2015). This literature holds organizational form fixed. Instead, we explore how firms 
respond to these incentives by increasing and diversifying their scope to facilitate reallocation of 
capital in internal capital markets. We also find that the scope of the phenomenon extends 
beyond publicly traded conglomerates to mergers and acquisitions among a different set of firms. 
More broadly, our results contribute to the literature on internal capital markets and 
diversified firms. This literature has shown that firm boundaries matter for capital and R&D 
allocation (Seru, 2014; Giroud and Mueller, 2015). A large body of work has presented evidence 
that is consistent with a cross-subsidization pattern in investment and labor (Shin and Stulz, 
1998; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000; Stein, 1997; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2009; Silva, 
2016), though several papers argue against such evidence (Chevalier, 1999; Maksimovic and 
Philips, 2001; Whited, 2001; Çolak and Whited, 2007; and Custódio, 2014). Our paper extends 
this literature by suggesting that organization structure may itself be designed to foster the ability 
of firms to use internal capital markets when these are most valuable.3 In doing so our work also 
speaks to the literature on the formation of diversified conglomerates (e.g., Servaes 1996; 
Almeida et al, 2011; and Maksimovic and Philips, 2002). Servaes (1996) for example, studies 
how the market valuation of conglomerates changed over time, and the relationship with 
conglomerate structure. Our paper differs from the literature by studying how external market 
conditions interact with firm scope. 
                                                          
3 For example, Lins and Servaes (2002) found no evidence of diversification premium in emerging markets where external frictions are more severe. 
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Our paper is also directly related to two strands of the literature on mergers and 
acquisitions. We are closest to the literature which explores relaxing financial constraints as a 
reason for mergers and acquisitions.4 Almeida, Campello, and Hackbarth (2011) present a model 
in which acquisitions alleviate financial constraints.  Erel, Jang, and Weisbach (2015) show that, 
in a sample of European firms, targets’ financial policies are less constrained after an acquisition. 
Within the M&A literature, our paper is also closely related to the literature on merger waves. 
Recent research analyzes several causes of merger waves: technological shocks (Harford, 2005), 
uncertainty (Garfinkel and Hankins, 2011), deregulation (Ovtchinnikov, 2013; and Harford, 
2005), and valuation errors (Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan, 2005). Another strand 
of the literature studies the selection of firms that participate in merger waves: public vs. private 
(Maksimovic, Phillips, and Yang, 2013) and well vs. badly governed firms (Duchin and Schmidt, 
2013). Though it is well documented that merger waves occur within industries and are 
propagated through industry links (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; and Ahern and Harford, 2014), 
our paper is the first to uncover that changes in aggregate degree of diversification in the 
economy correlates with external market conditions. 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
We use several datasets that cover different sets of firms over the period 1980 to 2012. In 
the first part of the paper we construct a sample based on Compustat. We construct this sample 
using Compustat Segment files and applying the standard filters. In particular, we (i) keep only 
business segments; (ii) exclude segments with negative assets, investment, or sales; (iii) exclude 
all firm-years that have missing information on assets, investment, or sales for all divisions; and 
(iv) exclude financials (SIC code 6) and utilities (SIC code 9).  
                                                          
4 Other possible gains from mergers range from market power (Borenstein, 1990) to taxes and operational synergies (Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy, 2009). 
 10  
We aggregate the divisions at the two-digit SIC level and define three measures of 
diversification: (a) Number of divisions is a count of the number of two-digit SIC business 
divisions the firm operates in a given year; (b) HHI Assets, the Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Concentration Index of division assets by firm-year and (c) HHI Sales, the Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Concentration Index of division sales by firm-year. For ease of interpretation, we use (1-HHI 
Assets) and (1-HHI Sales) as our second and third measures of diversification. This change 
makes all three measures of diversification increase with firm scope. We augment other firm 
level information using Compustat North America and construct other controls used in the 
regression (size, cash flow, Tobin’s Q, leverage, and firm age). The definition and construction 
of all the variables is described in the Appendix. 
Our sample contains a total of 14,700 unique firms and 120,142 firm-year observations 
with an average size (total assets in 2009 USD) of $1.2 Billion and a median of $67 Million. On 
average, over the sample period, each firm has 1.28 divisions (with a minimum of one and a 
maximum of ten divisions). There is, however, large variation in the average degree of 
diversification of firms over the period of 1980 and 2012. In 1980 the average firm had 1.72 
divisions, while in 1997 the average number of divisions was only 1.17. That there are periods of 
increase in firm scope followed by periods of reduction in scope, is also apparent in the evolution 
of the HHI of assets and sales.  
For the second part of the paper we focus on a completely different sample and analyze 
the evolution of firm scope by studying the M&A market. We collect data from Thomson SDC 
on all M&As where there is a change of control (acquirer has less than 50% of the target before 
the deal and more than 50% afterwards) between 1980 and 2012. We exclude all deals that do 
not have information on the announcement date and deals with missing data on the value of the 
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transaction. We then focus on completed deals between US firms (although we relax some of 
these filters in our robustness analysis). Our sample contains 38,979 observations comprising 
18,795 acquirer firms and 37,983 targets. The vast majority of deals involve a public acquirer 
and a private target (20,327 observations), followed by 6,557 deals involving both public target 
and acquirer firms, and 3,369 involving private targets and acquirers. For 543 deals we are able 
to match our M&A sample to Compustat North America and use control variables based on the 
financial data of the acquirer and the target firms.  
Finally, to measure the degree of financial frictions we use the TED spread. This measure 
is the difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government T-
bills. Intuitively, it measures the frictions in obtaining funding for banks. A large literature shows 
that frictions in supply of capital to banks spill over to the funding of firms (for example, 
Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). Matvos and Seru (2014) show that variation in the TED spread 
induces changes in the capital allocation in diversified firms. Table 1, Panels A, B, and C present 
the summary statistics for all the variables used in our empirical analysis for the different 
samples. 
3. Main empirical findings 
3.1. Scope of diversified firms 
Recent evidence suggests that diversified firms perform better when external financial 
markets are constrained (Matvos and Seru, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015; Almeida, 
Kim and Kim, 2015). As external markets tighten, a standalone firm cannot take advantage of 
good investment opportunities if it lacks internal financing. A conglomerate, on the other hand, 
can take advantage of investment opportunities by reducing investment in other, less productive 
parts of the firm. More diversified conglomerates are more likely to encounter situations in 
which such reallocation is productive. Increased diversification increases the likelihood that a 
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good investment opportunity which lacks internal funding in one division is contemporaneous 
with a low investment opportunity and excess cash in another division.5 We explore whether 
firms respond to incentives to increase and diversify their scope during times of external market 
distress. 
3.1.1. Firm scope 
In conglomerates, one potential measure of scope is the number of segments.  In our 
sample there is large variation in firm scope over time. The average number of segments in a 
diversified firm during the early 1980s was 2.4, so a typical conglomerate would reallocate 
capital across 2.4 two-digit SIC industries. By the early 1990s this number had decreased to 1.6.  
The scope of internal capital markets did not undergo these changes in isolation. The frictions in 
external capital markets, measured by TED, have fluctuated significantly over the same decades. 
Figure 1, Panel A shows that conglomerates have had more segments during times of high TED 
than during times of low TED. Conglomerates increase scope as frictions in external capital 
markets increase. This fact suggests that capital allocation in internal capital markets may 
become more attractive as external markets seize up, providing incentives for firms to increase 
their scope.  
We formally measure whether an increase in external market stress is correlated with an 
increase in the number of segments of a conglomerate using the following specification: 
 1it t it ity X       ,  ( 9 ) 
in which i indexes the firm and t indexes time. The dependent variable ity measures the number 
of firm segments. The independent variable of interest is the extent of external capital market 
                                                          5 We illustrate this mechanism more formally in a simple model in the Appendix. 
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frictions t , which is proxied by the TED spread in the main specification. We control for 
standard firm characteristics, such as size, profitability, leverage, and others, in itX .  
The result is presented in Table 2, Panel A, column 1. In times of high external capital 
market frictions, firms add additional divisions. The coefficient of 0.29 implies that a two 
standard deviation change in TED (2*0.4) is correlated with 0.29*2*0.4=23% of diversified 
firms adding a segment, which is 0.35 standard deviations in the number of segments in our 
sample. 
One possible concern with this result is that the composition of firms in the sample is 
correlated with external market frictions. We therefore repeat the analysis including firm fixed 
effects i : 
 1it t i it ity X        . ( 10 ) 
The result is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects (column 2 of Table 2, Panel A) 
and is highly statistically significant, suggesting that our results are not driven by the changing 
composition of firms. Times of high TED are times during which firms add segments. The 
coefficient of 0.11 implies that a two standard deviation increase in external capital market 
frictions (TED) is correlated with a 0.11*2*0.4=0.09 (0.26 standard deviations) increase in the 
number of segments within a firm.6 
To ensure these results apply across a wide array of firms, we perform the same analysis 
on several subsamples. In the full sample we include single segment firms, which can increase 
their scope by adding segments, but cannot decrease it. In Table 2, Panel B we focus only on 
                                                          
6 We use the within firm standard deviation of Number Divisions to perform this calculation. The difference between the estimates of column 1 and column 2 also allows us to assess how much of the change in the degree of diversification in the economy comes from the selection of firms during our sample period versus within-firm changes in scope. 
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firms which operate in at least two segments, and can therefore add or subtract segments. 
Columns 1 and 2 show that the results persist even when focusing on firms operating in multiple 
segments, with and without fixed effects. Last, we limit our sample to very diversified firms, 
which have at least three segments. These firms represent a third of all diversified firms. In 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 2, Panel C we present the results with and without firm fixed effects. 
The results confirm that firms with several segments are more likely to add an additional 
segment when external capital markets are distressed. 7 
The results presented above are consistent with the basic idea of Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975) that firms increase their scope when transactions in markets are more costly. 
Our predictions extend beyond this basic insight. If the payoffs to investment do not differ across 
divisions of a firm, then there is little economic motive for reallocating capital between divisions 
even when external markets are tight. Capital reallocation is more effective if returns to 
investments within the firm differ. Therefore, rather than simply adding segments, we would 
expect firms to become more diversified as external financial markets tighten.  
We measure firms’ assets diversification across industries by computing the Herfindahl-
Hirshman index (HHI) of firms’ assets across industries. A firm which operates in multiple 
segments is not well diversified if most of its assets are in one industry. Let it  denote the set of 
two-digit SIC industries, 8 in which firm i operates at time t, and ijtA  denotes the assets of that 
firm in industry j. Then, 
2
/
it it
it ijt ijtj j
HHI A A
 
      . Since a high HHI implies high 
                                                          
7 That the results with firm fixed effects are stronger for diversified and very diversified firms is consistent with the notion that it may be more costly for a stand-alone firm to become a conglomerate (going from 1 to 2 divisions) than it is for a conglomerate to add another division. 8 In Appendix C we confirm that the results are robust to defining industries either using one or three digit SIC codes. 
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concentration, we define our dependent variable as 1 itHHI . A higher value of the dependent 
variable therefore implies that a firm’s assets are more diversified across industries.  
To illustrate the relationship between firm diversity and external financial markets 
conditions, we first present a simple cut of the data. In Figure 1, Panel B, we plot the average 
diversity of firms’ assets in a year against the TED spread. One can see that times of high TED 
spreads are times during which conglomerates’ assets are more diversified. This simple fact 
suggests that firms respond to tightening external financial market conditions by diversifying 
their scope. To ensure that these patterns are not driven by firm composition, or changes in other 
firm characteristics, we estimate the following specification: 
 11 it t i it itHHI X          ,  ( 11 ) 
with and without firm fixed effects i . The result in column 3 of Table 2, Panel A confirms that 
in times of high external capital markets frictions firms increase the diversity of assets. The 
inclusion of firm fixed effects in column 4 shows that the results are not driven by changes in 
firm composition. The magnitudes are substantial: the coefficient of 0.027 implies that a two 
standard deviation increase in TED is correlated with a 0.23 standard deviation increase in asset 
diversification within a firm.  
Instead of measuring a firm’s assets diversification across industries, we measure its 
diversification of revenues. This measurement is based on the idea that cash flows measure the 
importance of a given segment to the firm better than physical capital. We repeat the exercise 
from above, but compute firms’ revenue diversification across two-digit SIC industries. The 
results with and without firm fixed effects are presented in columns 5 and 6 and mirror those on 
asset diversification. As external financial markets tighten, firms increase the diversification of 
their revenue sources.  
 16  
The increase in diversification of assets and revenues with TED is robust and occurs 
across different types of diversified firms. Because the diversification of single segment firms is 
hard-wired at 0 and cannot decrease, we exclude them in a robustness check in Table 2, Panel B. 
Columns 3 to 6 reveal that our findings are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. The results 
also hold for very diversified firms, those with more than two segments, which we show in Table 
2, Panel C, columns 3 to 6. These results suggest that firms respond to tightening external 
financial market conditions by diversifying their scope.  
3.1.2. Diversification of scope and capital reallocation  
Matvos and Seru (2014) show that the advantage of diversified firms in times of high 
external financial frictions arises from capital reallocation between divisions of the firm. Capital 
reallocation within a firm is productive if reducing investment in one division is less costly than 
the benefit of adding investment in another division, i.e. if the divisions’ investment needs are 
not very correlated. Our hypothesis is that firms change their scope to take further advantage of 
this benefit of internal capital markets. We therefore predict that when financial markets are 
constrained, firms adjust their scope to reduce the correlation in investment needs across 
divisions.  
The correlation of investment opportunities of divisions are difficult to observe directly. 
If two industries have highly correlated investment, then one would imagine that investment 
needs of two divisions of a firm, which operate in these two industries, would also be highly 
correlated. We compute how concentrated a firm’s investment needs are by weighting 
correlation of different industry pairs by assets of the firm in these pairs.  
We first compute the correlation of average investment across two-digit SIC industries 
for the period of our sample. For example, when firms in the Home Furniture, Furnishings, And 
Equipment Stores industry (SIC 57) invest a lot, firms in the Coal Mining industry (SIC 12) 
 17  
invest little, and vice versa. On the other hand, investment in industry SIC 38 - Measuring, 
Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches 
And Clocks - is highly correlated to investment in industry SIC 50 - Wholesale Trade-durable 
Goods. We first compute pairwise correlations between the average investments 9  of single-
segment firms of two-digit SIC industries for the period of our sample. Let Ijkc  denote the 
correlation of investments between industries j and k. 
To compute the concentration of firms’ investment needs, let it  be the set of two-digit 
SIC industries in which firm i operates at time t.  2it  is the set of all pairwise permutations of 
industries this firm operates in. For example, if firm i operates in industries 1, 2, and 3, then 
   2 1, 2;2,3;1,3it  . ijtA  denotes the assets of that firm in industry j. We compute investment 
need diversification of firm i at time t as      2 2/it itI Iit ijt ikt jk ijt iktjk jkC A A c A A           .  A 
higher measure implies that the divisions are in industries whose investment commoves more. 
Therefore a firm with a high IitC  has less diversified investment needs.  
We build on the specification from the previous section and estimate how a firm’s 
diversification of investment needs evolves with external capital market frictions: 
 1Iit t i it itC X          ,  ( 12 ) 
with and without firm fixed effects i . Firm fixed effects ensure that these changes are identified 
from changes in industrial composition within a firm over time. Note that the correlation 
between a pair of industries is computed over the entirety of the sample and does not change 
                                                          9 In unreported results, we show the results are robust to computing the correlation between median investment across industries 
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over time. Therefore our results are not driven by an increased correlation of investments or cash 
flows across industries as external financial markets tighten (TED increases). Rather, the 
industries that are added or expanded in high TED times have less correlated investment needs 
with the rest of the firm. 
The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 Table 3, Panel A. The negative coefficients 
confirm that as external financial markets tighten, firms adjust their scope by decreasing the 
correlation of investment needs across divisions. The result is robust to the inclusion of firm 
fixed effects and is therefore not driven by differences in investment opportunities across firms. 
The within-firm coefficient of -0.012 implies that a two standard deviation increase in TED  is 
correlated with a 0.2 standard deviation decrease in the correlation of investments within a firm. 
Profitable capital reallocation across divisions also requires low correlation in divisions’ 
cash flows. Consider a division with a high opportunity to invest. If its cash flow is high, 
reallocation is not necessary because the division can finance its own investment. If cash flows 
are low, then reallocation might be productive. However, if cash flows among divisions are 
highly correlated, then the cash flows of other divisions are low as well, providing little 
opportunity for reallocation. Therefore, if reallocation in internal capital markets becomes more 
valuable during times of high external capital market frictions, firms may want to reduce the 
correlation in the cash flows of their divisions.  
To construct a firm level proxy for cash flow concentration across segments, CFitC , we 
follow the same approach as before but use the pairwise correlation of average cash flows across 
different industries, CFjkc , as an input. We estimate how a firm’s concentration of cash flows 
evolves with external capital market frictions: 
 1CFit t i it itC X          ,  ( 13 ) 
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with and without firm fixed effects i , and present the results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, 
Panel A. The negative coefficient suggests that as external capital markets tighten, firms tilt their 
assets to industries whose cash flows are less correlated with the rest of the firm. The magnitudes 
are again substantial. A two standard deviation increase in TED decreases cash flow correlation 
of the firm by 0.23 standard deviations.  
In fact, the logic above suggests that an important driver of reallocation prospects is a 
division’s ability to use its cash flows to finance its own investment. If one division’s cash flow 
exceeds its investment needs, then these excess funds can be allocated to divisions whose cash 
flows are below their investment needs. We compute a measure of investment self-sufficiency, 
i.e. excess cash flows as (cash flows – investment). We compute the correlation in excess cash 
flows between industries as above, CF Ijkc  , and compute how diversified a firm’s excess cash 
flows are, CF IitC  . We estimate the specification from above using this measure, and find that as 
external market conditions deteriorate, firms tilt their industrial composition to decrease the 
correlation in excess cash flows (columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, Panel A).  
Similar to our measure of excess cash flows is a measure of financing deficit10 used in the 
literature to measure the dependence of a firm on external funds, which accounts for other uses 
and sources of funds, such as acquisitions, sale of property, plant and equipment, and changes in 
net working capital. For robustness, we compute the correlation of average financial deficits of 
stand-alone firms across all pairs of two-digit SIC industries for the period of our sample, and 
compute the correlation of financial deficits of a firm, FDitC , following the approach outlined 
above. The results are presented in columns 7 and 8 of Panel A of Table 3. As financial markets 
                                                          
10 See Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011). 
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tighten, firms adjust their structure to decrease the correlation in financing deficits across 
divisions. A lower correlation implies that as one division experiences financing deficits, other 
divisions are more likely to experience financing surpluses, increasing the potential for 
reallocation within the firm.11 To ensure that our results are robust, we re-estimate our results on 
different subsets of firms. The results hold if we exclude single segment firms from our sample 
(Table 3, Panel B). They also hold for firms which are already very diversified those with more 
than two segments, which we show in Panel C of Table 3.  
Figure 2 (Panels A-D) visually confirm the strong correlation that was documented in 
Table 3. We also measure our results on different subsamples using a variety of different 
measures, all suggesting that as external markets tighten, firms diversify their scope. The results 
appear in several different measures related to capital reallocation, some devised by ourselves, 
and some taken from the literature, supporting the idea that capital reallocation is a part of the 
explanation of why firms diversify when external markets tighten. When external markets 
tighten, capital reallocation within a firm becomes more valuable, especially among divisions 
whose investment opportunities, cash flows, and financing deficits are less correlated. Firms 
respond to these incentives by adjusting their scope in order to take better advantage of internal 
capital markets. These results imply that as financial intermediation of financial markets breaks 
down, capital intermediation activity shifts within firms, illustrating that transaction costs in 
markets determine the boundaries of the firm in the spirit of Coase (1937). 
4.2. Mergers and acquisitions 
In the previous section we study how the firms’ scope changes with conditions in external 
capital markets. The benefits of diversification in times of external financial market distress have 
                                                          11 All the results in the paper that use Compustat Segments data are robust to including a dummy variable that captures the segment reporting change that occurred in 1998.  
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been documented for conglomerates in the previous literature (Matvos and Seru, 2014; 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2015; Almeida, Kim and Kim, 2015). We find that conglomerates’ 
scope responds to these benefits. Next we look for similar phenomena in mergers and 
acquisitions, which are transactions directly aimed at changing firm boundaries. One way firms 
become more diversified is to undertake diversifying mergers and acquisitions.  
An additional advantage of studying mergers and acquisitions is the access to a broader 
sample of firms. We can look beyond large publicly traded firms to other public as well as 
private firms. Only approximately 6,500 deals from a total of roughly 39,000 involve a public to 
public transaction. The firms in the Compustat Segments sample, which we use in the previous 
section, have an average size of about $1.2 billion and a median of about $67 million. Private 
acquirers, on the other hand, have average assets of $4.3 billion with a median of $143 million. 
Private targets have average assets of $144 million with a median of $12 million (all values in 
2009 US dollars). 
3.2.1. Aggregate diversifying-merger activity 
The aggregate level of merger and acquisition activity experiences aggregate booms and 
busts—merger waves—which have been well documented in the literature (e.g. Mitchell and 
Mulherin 1996). We document a similar phenomenon taking place in the composition of mergers 
and acquisitions. Periods in which diversifying mergers are the predominant form of mergers are 
followed by periods dominated by focused mergers. In our sample there is large time-series 
variation in the share of diversified mergers and acquisitions, in which firms acquire, or merge 
with, firms from a different two-digit SIC industry. Before 1990, the majority of deals (value 
weighted) were diversifying. This share dropped to about 40% in 1990s, and again exceeded 
50% during the Great Recession.  
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Figure 3 shows that diversification activity is correlated with the conditions in external 
capital markets. Panel A shows that years of high TED are years during which diversifying 
mergers comprise a larger share of M&A transactions than years in which TED is low. Panel A 
presents results when deals are weighted by deal amount. Panel B shows that we obtain the same 
patters if we weigh deals equally. These figures suggest that it is not only conglomerates who 
find it valuable to diversify their scope during times of external market stress. Diversification 
activity seems to be strongly correlated with our measure of external capital market frictions, 
TED.  
We more formally study the relationship between TED and diversification activity within 
a regression framework. We explore how much variation in the share of diversifying mergers in 
a given year, ts , can be explained with variation TED, t  , in a simple linear regression 
framework:  
 t t ts       .  ( 14 ) 
We present the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4. As suggested by Figure 3, external 
market frictions are strongly correlated with the share of diversifying mergers in the economy. 
An increase in TED of 0.8 percentage points increases the share of the diversifying mergers by 
approximately 15 percentage points; or alternatively a two standard deviation in TED is 
correlated with a 1.45 standard deviation increase in the share of diversifying mergers. 
Moreover, an 2R  of over 50% suggests that this relationship captures a significant amount of 
variance in the aggregate share of diversifying mergers even in a simple linear setting. In column 
2 we equally weigh deals and confirm the results. 
 The strong positive relationship between external financial market frictions and the 
aggregate composition of mergers suggests that the same mechanism that drives the scope of 
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diversified firms is driving the aggregate composition of mergers. Agency problems have been a 
prominent explanation for diversifying mergers. If diversifying mergers are a symptom of empire 
building (Jensen, 1986), then one would expect them to predominate in good times, when firms 
are flush with cash and external capital markets are loose. Instead, times of high external 
financial distress are periods of low overall mergers and acquisitions activity, suggesting that 
empire building is not a likely source of diversification activity. These aggregate trends provide 
suggestive evidence that diversifying mergers are in part driven by firms’ need to diversify to 
promote internal capital market reallocation in the face of frictions in external capital markets. 
We next explore this idea in more detail. 
3.2.2. Composition of deals in diversification 
Our aggregate data results could be driven by the changing composition of firms or 
merger opportunities, rather than the attractiveness of internal capital markets during times of 
financial market freezes. We therefore study the propensity of individual deals to be diversifying, 
trying to account for the changing composition of mergers over time using the following 
specification: 
 ijt t i it j jt ity X X        ,  ( 15 ) 
in which i indexes the acquirer, j indexes the target, and t the time of the deal. ijty is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the deal is diversifying and 0 if it is not. The independent 
variable of interest is the extent of external capital market frictions t , which is proxied by the 
TED spread in the main specification. We control for standard acquirer and target characteristics, 
such as size, profitability, leverage, and others in itX , and jtX  .  
We present the results in Table 5, Panel A. We first estimate the relationship without 
controls, which gives us the largest sample. Then we restrict ourselves to mergers for which we 
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could find controls in Thomson data. In the last, narrowest sample we analyze, we match the 
acquirer and target with Compustat, which allows us to control for a wider set of characteristics, 
but a much smaller sample. The Compustat sample consists of 357 acquiring firms and 533 
targets. As we restrict our sample we increase the percentage of deals involving public firms. 
The share of public to public transactions increases from less than 17% in the full sample to 69% 
when Thomson controls are used and 94% with Compustat target and acquirer data. The value of 
the deal is also increasing: the average deal value is $133 million for the whole sample, $450 
million with Thomson controls, and $641 million in the deals involving Compustat firms. These 
different samples allow us to ensure our results are robust across a wide range of firms.  
In all specifications we find that as external market frictions increase, the probability that 
a deal will be diversifying increases. The coefficient of 0.37 suggests that a two standard 
deviation increase in TED is correlated with a 30 percentage point increase in probability that a 
given deal is diversifying. The magnitudes are larger in the smallest sample with better controls. 
Last, we confirm that the results hold in the sample of firms that are not in Compustat (Table 5, 
Panel B). This last subsample has a small share of deals classified by Thomson as public to 
public transactions and the average deal value is only $112 million as opposed to $641 million 
for the deals involving Compustat firms. Therefore variation in diversification activity over time 
is present across a wide range of firms.  
If merger activity is concentrated in industries, then a correlation between TED and 
industry merger waves could be driving our results. The share of diversifying mergers could 
increase because targets in a particular industry are being bought by a wide array of firms or, 
conversely, because acquirers in a given industry are on an acquisition spree, which is correlated 
with TED. In columns 5, 6, 9, and 10 we control for the industry of the acquirer, the target 
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separately, and, in columns 2, 4 and 8, for the industries of the acquirer and the target 
simultaneously, and find that the effect is robust. Conditional on the industry of the acquirer and 
target, the probability that a firm’s acquisitions are outside of its industry increases with TED. 
Jointly, these results confirm that the increase in the share of diversifying mergers around 
increases in TED is a broad-based phenomenon, not limited to a particular set of firms. We 
confirm the robustness of these results to alternative definitions of industries and external capital 
market frictions in the Appendices. 
3.2.3. Mechanism: diversifying investment needs and cash flows  
Our hypothesis is that firms change their scope to generate the potential for internal 
capital reallocation in times of external capital market frictions. In the previous section we find 
that large diversified firms adjust their scope to reduce the correlation in investment needs, cash 
flows, and financing deficits across divisions when external financial markets are constrained. 
Here we examine whether we can observe the same phenomenon in mergers and acquisitions. 
We want to understand whether targets’ industries’ investment, cash flows, and financial 
deficits are less correlated with acquirers’ industry cash flows during times of high external 
market frictions. As in Section 3.1.2, we denote the correlation of investment between the 
industries of the acquirer and the target as Ijkc , the correlation in industries’ cash flows as CFjkc , 
the cash flows in excess of investment as CF Ijkc  , and financial dependence as FDjkc . 
We first explore aggregate data to see if patterns in diversification activity over time are 
related to internal capital markets reallocation. We determine whether a merger diversifies 
investment opportunities or cash flows by computing our measures of correlation between the 
industries of the target and the acquirer. We then compute the annual average (value weighted) 
degree of diversification according to each measure and show its correlation with TED in Figure 
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4. For example, in Figure 4, Panel A we show the average correlation in investment between the 
industries of the target and the acquirer, and plot it against TED. The two measures are strongly 
negatively correlated: as external market frictions increase, firms acquire targets in industries 
with lower average correlation in investment.  
Panel B, Panel C, and Panel D show the same pattern in the correlation of cash flows, 
cash flows- investment, and financial deficits between the industries of the acquirer and the 
target. All these measures exhibit substantial correlation with TED: as TED increases, the 
acquirers choose targets in industries with a lower correlation in cash flows, and financing 
deficits with the industry of the acquirer. These figures suggest that the correlation between 
patterns in diversification activity and conditions in capital markets is related to aggregate 
movements in measures related to internal capital markets reallocation.  
We more formally explore how much of the annual average correlation between target 
and acquirer industries, tc , can be explained with variation  in TED, t  , in a simple linear 
regression framework:  
 t t tc       .  ( 16 ) 
We present the results in Table 6, Panel A. As suggested in Figure 4, external market 
frictions are strongly associated with a decrease in the correlation between the acquirer’s and the 
target’s industries for all our measures. The variation in TED explains a substantial part of the 
aggregate variation in the correlation of investment ( 2R of 52%), cash flows ( 2R of 55%), cash 
flows in excess of investment ( 2R of 55%), and financing deficits ( 2R of 74%). The aggregate 
data certainly suggests that patterns in diversification activity, which are correlated in TED, are 
undertaken to promote internal capital markets reallocation.  
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To ensure that the results are not driven by the changing composition of firms or merger 
opportunities, we now turn to transactions data and estimate the following specification, 
illustrated on the example of correlation of investment between the industries of the acquirer and 
the target: 
 Iij t i it j jt itc X X        .  ( 17 ) 
The independent variable of interest is the extent of external capital market frictions t , 
which is proxied by the TED spread in the main specification. We again control for standard 
acquirer and target characteristics in itX , and jtX . 
The results are presented in Table 6, Panel B. Columns 1 and 2 present the results on the 
larger sample, only controlling for industry (column 2); columns 3 to 6 present mergers and 
acquisitions with controls from Thompson. The last columns (7 to 10) present the results for the 
subset of Compustat firms, which allow us to control for a wider set of characteristics. The 
negative coefficients in all specifications suggest that as TED increases, firms increasingly 
acquire targets from industries which have a lower correlation in investment with their own. A 
two standard deviation increase in TED decreases the correlation of investment between 
industries by 0.53 standard deviations in the Compustat sample with more controls.  
As we state above, the correlation in investment between industries is not the only way to 
measure the potential for capital reallocation between the acquirer and a target. We replace the 
correlation in investments with the correlation in cash flows, CFijc , in Table 6, Panel C. We find 
that as external capital market frictions increase, acquirers choose targets from industries whose 
cash flows are less correlated with the industry of the acquirer. The magnitudes are substantial: a 
two standard deviation increase in TED is correlated with a 0.41 standard deviation decline in the 
cash flow correlation between the industries of the target and the acquirer. We obtain similar 
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results when we measure the potential for capital reallocation between the acquirer and the target 
as the correlation in the cash flows excess of investment CF Ijkc  , and financial dependence FDjkc , 
presented in Panels D and E respectively. As financial market frictions increase, acquirers 
choose targets from industries less correlated with their own.  
Next, we again confirm that our results are not driven by the industry of the acquirer and 
the target by including acquirer and target industry fixed effects. Conditional on the industry, 
acquirers are more likely to find targets from industries with less correlated cash flow, 
investment, the cash flows excess of investment, and financial dependence in times of external 
market dislocation. These results are again robust to different samples of firms. As we move 
from including all deals to restricting the sample to include more controls, we also include a 
larger share of public to public deals and larger average transaction size, which reveals the 
different nature of the samples. 
These results strongly mirror those we find for conglomerates, even though the sample of 
firms we analyze is significantly different, with the merged sample encompassing a wide sample 
of smaller and private firms. Moreover, in conglomerates, we consider the changes in scope 
within a firm. In mergers and acquisitions, we study the change in scope conditional on a large 
expansion of firm scope. The robust results strongly suggest that firms respond to external 
capital market stress by expanding and diversifying the scope of internal capital markets to 
facilitate capital reallocation.  
4. Extensions and robustness 
4.1. Choice of deal compensation 
We next examine the type of compensation used in the merger or acquisition. In cash 
mergers, acquirers purchase shares from target shareholders with cash. A stock merger, on the 
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other hand, does not require cash outlays. If outside funds are scarce, then decreasing the amount 
of cash would not be appealing and we should expect more stock mergers. We examine whether 
and how much cash was used in the deal by estimating the following specification: 
 ijt t i it j jt ity X X        ,  ( 18 ) 
in which the dependent variable ijty  measures the means of payment when acquirer i 
acquires target j at time t. For example, in the baseline specification ijty measures the percentage 
of compensation paid in cash. Building on previous specifications, the independent variable of 
interest is the extent of external capital market frictions t  measured using the TED spread, and 
itX , and jtX  control for standard acquirer and target characteristics. 
The results are presented in Table 7. We use several measures of whether and how much 
cash was used in the deal. In columns 1, 2, and 3 we start by showing that, in aggregate terms, 
when TED increases, the use of cash in the M&A market decreases. We then explore individual 
deals in Panel B. In columns 3 and 4 we measure the percentage of compensation that was paid 
for in cash. A coefficient of -0.3 implies that a two standard deviation increase in TED decreases 
the share of acquisition which was paid for in cash by approximately 24 percentage points, or 
equivalently, by 0.53 standard deviations. As external financial market conditions tighten, firms 
are significantly more reluctant to use cash to complete an acquisition. The share of transactions 
that use some cash declines precipitously with TED, as we show in columns 5 and 6. Similarly, 
transactions in which cash is the only means of payment decline as TED increases (columns 7 
and 8). Jointly, these results suggest that as external financial constraints tighten, firms are more 
reluctant to use cash for acquisitions. While this result is not exclusive to our hypothesis, it 
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provides one additional piece of evidence that is consistent with our preferred interpretation of 
the overall evidence.  
4.2. Persistence 
Firms change their scope slowly. A focused firm does not become extremely diversified 
one year, and switch back to being focused the next year, suggesting there are costs to changing 
organizational structure. In light of such slow adjustments of organizational structure, how do we 
interpret the effect of dislocations in external capital markets on firms’ organizational structure?  
We first document that capital market distortions also have a persistent component. 
Enormous spikes in TED, such as the 4.58 on October 10, 2008, quickly decline; by the end of 
October, the spread had declined to 2.59. If spikes in external capital market conditions are short-
lived, on the order of a month, and then capital markets revert back to steady state; it would be 
difficult to expect large changes in firm scope. Previous literature suggests that credit market 
dislocations are persistent and large enough to induce substantial changes in investment as well 
as GDP (see Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012). For example, Matvos and Seru (2014) show that 
capital allocation in diversified firms responds to the TED spread. Therefore these dislocations 
may also be persistent and large enough to also affect firms’ organizational structure.  
One way to evaluate how quickly external market measures revert is to estimate the 
following specification: 
 1t t t        ( 19 ) 
The estimate of 0.86 confirms the high degree of autocorrelation in external capital 
market conditions.12 This result does not arise because TED hovers close to the mean with small 
deviations. Recall that the standard deviation is 0.4, around the mean of 0.5, suggesting                                                           12  Other measures of external capital market conditions, such as the BAA-AAA spread, or the Excess Bond Premium (EBP) also exhibit similar levels of persistence.  
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substantial departures. Another way to see the same fact is to consider the probability that that 
TED switches from high (above median) to low (below median). There is a 13% probability of 
transitioning from a low to high TED year and a 19% probability of going from high TED to low 
TED next year. These estimates suggest that external capital market conditions are quite 
persistent. Therefore, firms adjust their structure not only because external market conditions are 
poor, but because they expect that external capital market conditions will persist.  
To evaluate how organizational structure and financial market dislocation jointly evolve 
over time, we first estimate the following specification: 
 1 1it it t it ity y X         ,  ( 20 ) 
in which ity measures the scope of firm i at time t, and 1ity  the scope of the same firm from the 
previous year. The first coefficient of interest is  , which measures the persistence of changes in 
firms’ scope. The second coefficient of interest is β, which measures the initial impact of 
external financial frictions. This specification allows us to account for slow organizational 
change.  Finding   close to 1 implies that organizational structure today is very closely related 
to the organizational structure a year ago, which would be the result of the cumulative external 
market experience by the firm in the past. A   close to 0 would imply that the organizational 
structure today is independent of the organizational form one year ago, and as such, would imply 
a small level of persistence and path dependence. The latter would happen if costs of adjusting 
organizational structure were negligible. In Table 8, Panel A we find that firms increase their 
scope as TED increases. Moreover, the organizational structure contains a large persistent 
component, suggesting that the costs of changing the organizational are not negligible. An 
increase in in external financial conditions therefore affects organizational structure with a half-
life of about 4 years. 
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In the previous specification of this section, we assume that TED shocks are independent 
over time. However the degree of external financial conditions could itself be persistent. To 
account for the persistence in the organizational structure as well as external market conditions, 
we estimate a panel VAR system of the type: 
ݕ௜௧ = ߙଵ + ∅ଵݕ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶߞ௜௧ିଵ 
   ߞ௜௧ = ߙଶ + ߚଵߞ௜௧ିଵ + ∅ଶݕ௜௧ିଵ     ( 21 ) 
Here, y is Number Divisions and ߞ  is the TED spread. The implied assumptions under 
this approach are that the organizational structure of firm i at time t depends on the 
organizational structure of the firm at time t-1 and also on the TED spread at time t-1. Moreover, 
the level of TED spread evolves according to an autoregressive process where the level of TED 
spread at time t depends on the level of TED spread at t-1 and also on the organizational 
structure at t-1. This methodology is similar to that employed by Love and Zicchino (2006). 
Under this approach, we estimate higher levels of persistence, with a shock to TED 
affecting firms’ scope with a half-life of about 10 years, as can be observed in Table 8, Panel B 
and the Impulse Response Function presented in Figure 5. Overall, we confirm our results from 
the previous sections and show that firms adjust their organizational structure in response to 
changes in the external financial environment. The results in this section also suggest that the 
organizational structure of firms may be determined by the accumulation of external financial 
frictions experienced in the past.  
4.3. Evidence from US bank branch deregulation 
Our analysis so far mainly exploits time series variation in external market conditions to 
identify our results. In this section we use the staggered nature of bank branch deregulation 
across U.S. states during the 1980s and 1990s a source of variation in external financial market 
 33  
frictions (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). Because the timing of deregulation was staggered across 
states, we move away from time series variation, and instead explore our hypothesis in a 
difference-in-differences setting. As bank branching became less regulated the degree of frictions 
in financial markets decreased. This reduction in frictions should allow firms in deregulated 
states to narrow their scope and become less diversified.  
To measure banking (de)regulation across states over time, we follow Black and Strahan 
(2001) and more recently Hombert and Matray (2016).13 We construct a deregulation index as 
the sum of the ways in which banks can expand their operations. For example, a state that does 
not allow multibank holding companies, does not allow branching by means of mergers and 
acquisitions and does not allow de novo branching will have a deregulation index of zero. On the 
other extreme, a state that allows banks to expand their activity in all three ways will have an 
index with a value of three.  
We first test whether bank branch deregulation in the states in which firms are located14 
affects their scope using the following specification: 
 ݕ௜௧௦ = ߙ + ߚଵܦ݁ݎ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௦௧ + ߜ௦ + ߤ௧ + ߤ௜ +ΓX௜௧ + ߝ௜௧௦ ( 22 ) 
in which ity measures the scope of firm i at time t in state s. We include state ߜ௦ to control for 
state level differences in firm scope, and time fixed effects for aggregate changes that might 
affect firm scope. In specifications we also include firm fixed effects, ߤ௜. Therefore we identify 
the effect of bank deregulation from within state differences in firm scope, and how these change 
with bank deregulation. Changes in states that have not experienced deregulation serve as a 
control group.  
                                                          13 During this period, states deregulated bank expansion in three main ways: (i) by permitting the formation of multibank holding companies; (ii) by permitting branching by means of merger and acquisitions (M&As) only, and (iii) by permitting unrestricted (de novo) branching. 14 We assign firms to states using the information on the location of headquarters available in Compustat. 
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We present the results in Table 9, and mirror the ones we find when we use variation in 
the TED spread to measure the extent of financial frictions. When a state deregulates banking, 
firms, which are headquartered in the state, decrease their scope relative to firms in states, which 
have not deregulated their banking industry. Similarly, bank deregulation leads to less diversified 
firms. We find similar, although nosier, results when we repeat the analysis with firm fixed 
effects. In Table 10 we use the correlation of investment, cash flows, cash flows minus 
investments and financing deficit across the different divisions of the conglomerate as our 
measures of corporate diversification. The results again reflect the ones we find when we use 
variation in the TED spread to measure the extent of financial frictions. When we repeat the 
analysis including firm fixed effects, we find similar results in terms of economic and statistical 
significance.  
Next, we turn to the M&A sample and test whether firms become less prone to making 
diversifying acquisitions as their state deregulates branching using a similar difference-in-
differences specification as above: 
 1   .stijst i it js t jt ijstDeregulation Index Acqy X X           ( 22 ) 
in which i indexes the acquirer, j indexes the target, s indexes the state in which the acquirer is 
headquartered, and t the time of the deal. ijsty is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the deal 
is diversifying and 0 if it is not.   .stDeregulation Index Acq measures the banking deregulation 
index in the state of the acquirer at time t. Unlike in the rest of the paper, the variation in the 
condition of external financial markets is absorbed by time fixed effects, which also absorb any 
other aggregate variation in that might induce diversification. Further, state fixed effects control 
for differences between states, which might lead to diversifying acquisitions, such as the 
composition of firms within a state.  
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We present the results in Table 11. The probability that a firm makes a diversifying 
acquisition decreases as its local banking market is deregulated, with estimates being negative 
across all specifications. As before, economic magnitudes tend to be larger in the sample with 
better controls. Table 12 shows that banking deregulation results in more diversifying mergers 
when we use other measures of diversification: after deregulation targets are chosen from 
industries with more correlated, investment, cash flows, as well as financing deficits. Overall, 
these results suggest that our results are not an artifact of time series variation in external 
financial market conditions, but that firms respond to external capital market stress by expanding 
and diversifying the scope of internal capital markets to facilitate capital reallocation. 
4.4. Heterogeneity of effects 
Disruptions in external markets should hamper some industries more than others. In 
particular, more volatile industries should be ones where the sensitivity of firm scope to TED 
should be higher. We now assess if this conjecture is borne out in the data. 
In order to measure industry sensitivity to TED, we start by taking the average sales of 
undiversified firms by 2-digit SIC industry-year. We then calculate the correlation between 
average industry sales and TED for all 2 digit SIC industries during our sample period. Table 13, 
Panel A and Panel B shows that Compustat Segments firms that operate in industries more 
sensitive to TED – i.e., have a higher correlation between sales and TED -- adjust their 
organizational structure more in response to changes in TED than those firms that operate in 
industries that are less sensitive to external financial frictions.  
The model we developed suggests that the benefits of diversified firms increase with 
volatility, and more so during times of high external market frictions. Next, we test whether our 
results are stronger for firms that operate in more volatile industries. We construct a 2-digit SIC 
industry level measure of volatility by taking the standard deviation of the yearly average sales 
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by stand-alone firms in the industry and dividing by the mean of the yearly average sales by 
stand-alone firms in the industry.  Panel C and D of Table 13 show that organizational change in 
Compustat Segments firms that operate in more volatile industries is more responsive to TED.   
We also test whether the sensitivity of the industry to TED and the industry volatility of 
the acquiring and target firms in M&A deals influence the degree to which TED affects the 
probability of engaging in a diversifying M&A. We find that the results have the expected 
coefficients, but are statistically weaker. These results are reported in Appendix I to conserve 
space. 
Taken as a whole, these results support the view that firms that operate in more volatile 
industries and firms that operate in industries that are more sensitive to TED adjust their scope 
more in response to changes in the degree of external market frictions. Both of these predictions 
are consistent with the predictions of the simple model of internal capital markets we derive in 
the Appendix. 
4.5. Empire building 
Our results suggest that the organizational structure of firms partially evolves as an 
optimal response to exogenous variation in external financial conditions. We test the idea that 
diversifying scope may not be simply motivated by empire building motives further using the 
Entrenchment Index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). We find that firms with a higher 
level of entrenchment are, on average, more diversified, as one would expect if diversification 
was driven by empire building motives. However, the scope of entrenched organizations is also 
less responsive to the evolution of external financial conditions. These results, presented in Table 
14, reinforce the view that the value of being diversified is time varying and that it may be 
optimal to increase the degree of diversification of the firm in times when external financial 
frictions are large, as a way to promote capital reallocation within the firm. 
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4.6. Robustness 
In Appendices A to I we further establish the robustness of our main findings by using 
the BAA-AAA spread as a measure of external financial frictions (Appendix A), using 
contemporaneous TED spread as a measure of external financial frictions (Appendix B), defining 
diversification at the one- and three-digit SIC levels (Appendix C), analyzing all M&A deals 
instead of focusing on completed deals only (Appendix D), analyzing only large firms and large 
M&A deals (Appendix E), excluding the recent financial crisis, NBER recessions, and periods of 
extreme values of TED (Appendix F), clustering standard errors by industry-year (Appendix G), 
controlling for the 1998 change in Compustat Segments reporting (Appendix H) and showing the 
heterogeneity of effects in M&As (Appendix I). Overall these appendices confirm the general 
nature of our findings. 
5. Conclusion 
We document new facts which relate the evolution of firm scope to the changing frictions 
in external capital markets over the last three decades. In the first part of the paper, we study the 
scope of large, publicly traded firms. We find that firms increase their scope during times of high 
external capital market frictions, such as in the recent Great Recession. Moreover, during these 
times, firms diversify their investment needs and cash flows across industries. In the second part, 
we find similar phenomena outside diversified public firms. Examining the mergers and 
acquisitions activity of standalone and diversified private as well as public firms we uncover 
similar patterns. In aggregate data we find shifts in the composition of mergers from focused to 
diversifying and back, which are correlated with external market conditions.  This body of 
evidence suggests that the reason for that relationship lies in the firms’ propensity to create an 
internal capital market in times when external capital markets operate poorly. Our results suggest 
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that the organizational structure of firms partially evolves as an optimal response to exogenous 
variation in external financial conditions.   
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Appendix: Framework to Generate Empirical Predictions 
 
We present a stylized framework, which illustrates how the benefits of a diversified firm 
change with external market conditions. To keep the model streamlined, we omit any costs of 
diversified firms. The setup is as follows. There are two industries, 1 and 2. Firms can be 
diversified across both industries, or produce as stand-alones.  After observing productivity i , a 
firm in industry i invests iI  resulting in a gross return of i iI , and adjustment costs 22iI .  To 
simplify the analysis, the firm has no internal funds for investment. Accessing external financing 
in the amount of e has a deadweight cost 2en , 0.5 0  15  .   measures the degree of 
frictions in external capital markets; a high   captures times during which the costs of accessing 
external capital markets are high, such as the financial crisis. n measures the number of divisions, 
so n=1 for stand-alone firms and n=2 for diversified firms. Our set up implies that a firm, which 
is a collection of identical divisions, has no (dis)advantage over an equivalent collection of 
stand-alone firms in the costs of accessing external markets.  
To capure the idea that a firm cannot quickly change from stand-alone to diversified and 
vice versa (Gomes and Livdan, 2004), we analyze the effect of diversification before industry 
productivities are known. Industries 1 and 2 are ex ante identical: their expected productivity as 
well as the variance of productivity shocks are equal, i.e., 1 2[ [] ]E E    and 
    21 2Var Var    . As we see later, the correlation of productivity shocks across industries 
play a central role; we denote it by  1 12 2,Cov     . We relax the assumption that external 
                                                          
15 Bounding  0.5   ensures the problem is well behaved. 
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capital market conditions are known before the organizational structure is chosen in the last part 
of this section.  
A.1. Stand-alone benchmark 
We first analyze stand-alone firms (indexed by s), which serve as a benchmark for a 
conglomerate.  After it observes productivity, the stand-alone firm in industry i decides to 
maximize its value by choosing external market financed investment: 
 
2 22. .
i i is
is
is s
s
I
Imax e
s It
I
e


    
First order conditions imply optimal investment is: 
 1 2
1
is iI   , ( 1 ) 
The expression is intuitive. Investment increases in the productivity of the firm, i , and 
decreases in the costs of external funds, captured by the shadow cost of capital 11 2 .  The 
corresponding stand-alone value of firm for a given productivity realization is: 
 21 2
1
2 iisV
    ( 2 ) 
A.2. Diversified firm 
The diversified firm (indexed by d) maximizes the joint value of both divisions: 
 1 2
2 2 21 2, 1 1 2 2
1 2
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Resulting in the following investment for each division: 
   11 2id ii iI         ( 3 ) 
First, note that if there are no financial constraints, 0  , the investment of the 
conglomerate equals that of stand-alone firms in the corresponding industries. Investment in the 
diversified firm departs from that of stand-alone firms if external financing is costly. Financial 
constraints have two effects on the investment of the diversified firm.  
First, as in stand-alone firms, higher costs of external finance imply that a division 
obtains less financing, because the shadow cost of capital is higher, which is captured in the term 
1
1 2  . Second, as financial constraints increase, the internal capital markets reallocate capital. 
The difference between the investments in the division of a conglomerate, idI , and the stand-
alone firm, isI , in the same industry is: 
  11 2id is i iI I       ( 4 ) 
This expression illustrates that internal capital markets divert capital to the more 
productive divisions, which invests more than a stand-alone firm in that industry. Conversely, the 
less productive division invests less than its stand-alone counterpart.  
This reallocation in internal capital markets is valuable. The value of the diversified firm 
given a realization of productivity is: 
    
2 2 21 2 1 211 2 2 2dV
   
        . ( 5 ) 
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Because we omit any costs of diversification, the value of the diversified firm is larger 
than the combined value of stand-alone firms. 16  Denote the diversified firm premium as
 1 2d s sV V V V    . Then: 
    1 2
2
1 2 2V
       ( 6 ) 
The realized reallocation benefits are increasing in the dispersion of productivity across 
divisions,   2i i  , and are higher when it is more difficult to access capital in external 
capital markets, i.e., when   is higher, 0V   . 
A.3. Incentives to Diversify 
One does not expect firms to adjust their structure instantaneously upon observing 
productivity. We therefore analyze the expected benefits of diversified firms before productivity 
is known, capturing the adjustment lag. With a little algebra, one can show that the expected 
diversification premium reduces to the following expression:17 
    12[ ] 1 2E V         ( 7 ) 
The expected diversification premium provides the firm incentives to diversify.  
We next examine how these incentives change with external market conditions. We first 
examine the advantage of conglomerates relative to stand-alone firms. The realized advantage of 
                                                          16 In a more general setting with costs of diversification (e.g., socialism as in Matvos and Seru, 2014), the benefits of diversification would be lower by such costs. 
17    2 2 21 2 12 12 22 22 2 2E                        
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diversified firm increases with the cost of external funding, so it is not surprising, that the 
expected value does as well, i.e. [ ] 0E V   .18 This result suggests that stand-alone firms should 
add divisions when external capital markets tighten, and vice versa.  
Next we examine how the structure of a diversified firm affects its value. As we show 
above, the realized value of diversification is increasing in the value of reallocation in internal 
capital markets. If the productivity shocks across divisions are highly correlated, then there is 
little benefit of moving resources from one division to the next,
12
[ ] 0E V   . The gains from 
reallocation are larger when productivity differences are larger, i.e. when shocks are large. 
Therefore, the expected benefits of a diversified firm decrease with the correlation of 
productivity across divisions and increase with the variance of productivity shocks: [ ] 0E V   . 
Our primary interest is to understand how the incentives to structure a diversified firm 
change with external market conditions. Because the benefits of reallocation are higher when 
external financial markets are constrained, the benefit of having uncorrelated productivity across 
divisions is particularly pronounced in tight markets:
1
2
2
] 0[ VE     . Moreover, integrating the 
firm is more profitable if productivity is more volatile, since that leads to larger benefits of 
reallocation: 2 ] 0[E V      .  
                                                          
18 Recall that       12cov , var varx y x y       
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Overall, our framework predicts that as external capital markets tighten the incentives to 
conglomerate increase, particularity across industries with less correlated productivity and 
industries with larger productivity shocks. 
 A.4. Time varying external market conditions 
By modeling   as a parameter, we de facto assume that external capital market 
conditions are permanent.  Suppose instead, that external market conditions change over time, 
and by the time firms choose whether to diversify, the conditions have changed. Then 
diversifying would be less valuable.  To capture this intuition, consider the following extension. 
When the firm chooses organizational structure, the state of external markets is 0 . After the 
firm chooses organizational structure, the new state of capital markets   is realized. Suppose the 
firm observes productivity only after   is realized and invests. Intuitively, as long as external 
market conditions are not completely temporary, the qualitative results from above should 
remain intact, because the benefits of diversification should at least partially be preserved.  
Suppose external market conditions follow an AR1 process, we can assess how the 
permanence of conditions affects diversification gains more directly. Denote the expected value 
of diversification observe 0  at the time firms choose organizational structure and as 0 [ ]E E V  , 
and denote the autoregressive coefficient as  .19 Then: 
 0
0
[ ] [ ]E E V E V 
       ( 8 ) 
                                                          
19 To obtain the result, first order Taylor expand 0 around the benchmark of frictionless external capital market 
(i.e., 0 0  ). 
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If shocks to external market conditions are not permanent, then the change in value from 
diversification is approximately proportional to the autoregressive coefficient relative to the case 
under which the shocks are permanent. 
Table 1
Summary statistics.
This table presents the summary statistics for the different samples used in the
analysis. For each variable we report the number of observations, mean and standard
deviation. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the sample of Compustat Seg-
ments firms, Panel B presents the summary statistics for the sample of Individual M&A
deals and Panel C presents the summary statistics for the Aggregate M&A sample. All
three samples span the period 1980 to 2012. The sample construction is detailed in the
data section of the paper and all variables are defined in the Appendix.
Panel A: Summary statistics for the Compustat Segments sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
TED 33 .504 .399
Number Divisions 120,142 1.281 .662
1-HHI Assets 120,142 .067 .168
1-HHI Sales 120,142 .091 .222
Firm Investment Correlation 111,328 .954 .116
Firm CF Correlation 111,328 .935 .145
Firm (CF - Investment) Correlation 111,328 .935 .145
Firm Financing Deficit Correlation 111,328 .960 .102
Lag Size 120,142 4.563 2.507
Lag CF/A 120,142 -.196 1.366
Lag Q 120,142 3.646 13.555
Lag Leverage 120,142 .365 .257
Age 120,142 16.234 12.434
Panel B: Summary statistics for the individual M&A sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Diversified M&A 38,979 .483 .500
Investment Correlation Acquirer – Target 38,918 .708 .378
CF Correlation Acquirer – Target 38,918 .578 .470
(CF - Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Target 38,918 .589 .464
Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target 38,918 .761 .304
% Cash 29,182 .436 .452
Use Cash 29,182 .550 .498
All Cash 29,182 .320 .467
Panel C: Summary statistics for the aggregate M&A sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Share Diversified Deals 33 .498 .066
Share Diversified Value 33 .470 .102
Aggregate Investment Correlation in M&As 33 .702 .071
Aggregate CF Correlation in M&As 33 .581 .098
Aggregate (CF - Investment) Correlation in M&As 33 .593 .101
Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation in M&As 33 .750 .070
Aggregate % Cash 33 .407 .235
Aggregate Use Cash 33 .524 .279
Aggregate All Cash 33 .277 .177
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Table 2
Evolution of firm diversification and external market conditions.
This table shows the relationship between firm scope and external financial frictions.
We report coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of
Compustat Segments firms: Yit = α + β1 · TEDt + X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Number
Divisions in columns 1 and 2, 1-HHI Assets in columns 3 and 4 and 1-HHI Sales in
columns 5 and 6. The matrix of controls X includes Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag
Leverage, and Age. The sample used to perform the estimation in Panel A contains all
firms in the Compustat Segments sample. Panel B contains diversified firms (firms with
at least two 2 digit SIC divisions) and Panel C contains very diversified firms (firms
with at least three 2 digit SIC divisions). All variables are defined in the Appendix.
The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012, and its construction is detailed in the data
section of the paper. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by year. Statistical
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: All firms in Compustat Segments sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
TED 0.290*** 0.112*** 0.067*** 0.027*** 0.046*** 0.022***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 120,142 120,142 120,142 120,142 120,142 120,142
R2 0.104 0.676 0.094 0.652 0.055 0.666
Panel B: Only diversified firms in Compustat Segments sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
TED 0.339*** 0.178*** 0.093*** 0.028*** 0.068*** 0.024***
(0.035) (0.045) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 22,951 22,951 22,951 22,951 22,951 22,951
R2 0.098 0.586 0.119 0.650 0.056 0.610
Panel C: Only very diversified firms in Compustat Segments sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
TED 0.323*** 0.348*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.038***
(0.046) (0.070) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 7,079 7,079 7,079 7,079 7,079 7,079
R2 0.053 0.463 0.049 0.570 0.046 0.584
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Table 3
Diversification using cashflows & investment correlations and external market conditions.
This table estimates the relationship between the degree of diversification of firms measured by the correlation among
divisions of conglomerates and the TED spread. We report coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on
the sample of Compustat Segments firms: Yit = α+ β1 · TEDt +X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Firm Investment Correlation in
columns 1 and 2, Firm CF Correlation in columns 3 and 4, Firm (CF - Investment) Correlation in columns 5 and 6 and
Firm Financing Deficit Correlation in columns 7 and 8. The matrix of controls X includes Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q,
Lag Leverage, and Age. The sample in Panel A contains all firms in the Compustat Segments sample. Panel B contains
diversified firms (firms with at least two 2 digit SIC divisions) and Panel C contains very diversified firms (firms with at
least three 2 digit SIC divisions). All variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012,
and its construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by year.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: All firms in Compustat Segments sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Investment Firm CF Firm (CF - Investment) Firm Financing
Correlation Correlation Correlation Deficit Correlation
TED -0.050*** -0.012*** -0.066*** -0.017*** -0.066*** -0.016*** -0.040*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328
R2 0.125 0.770 0.147 0.766 0.148 0.765 0.115 0.766
Panel B: Only diversified firms in Compustat Segments sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Investment Firm CF Firm (CF - Investment) Firm Financing
Correlation Correlation Correlation Deficit Correlation
TED -0.065*** -0.019*** -0.078*** -0.028*** -0.079*** -0.026*** -0.047*** -0.015***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 21,842 21,842 21,842 21,842 21,842 21,842 21,842 21,842
R2 0.159 0.795 0.225 0.733 0.231 0.734 0.155 0.814
Panel C: Only very diversified firms in Compustat Segments sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Investment Firm CF Firm (CF - Investment) Firm Financing
Correlation Correlation Correlation Deficit Correlation
TED -0.043*** -0.020** -0.049*** -0.031*** -0.052*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.016**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 6,734 6,734 6,734 6,734 6,734 6,734 6,734 6,734
R2 0.092 0.804 0.097 0.653 0.107 0.661 0.110 0.845
51
Table 4
Diversifying Mergers & Acquisitions and external
market conditions.
This table estimates the relationship between ag-
gregate M&A activity and the TED spread. We re-
port coefficients from estimating the following OLS
regression on the Aggregate M&A sample: Yit =
α + β1 · TEDt + it. Where Y is Share Diversified
Value in column 1 and Share Diversified Deals in
column 2. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012, and its
construction is detailed in the data section of the
paper. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market
with ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2)
Share Diversified Share Diversified
Value Deals
TED 0.185*** 0.119***
(0.032) (0.020)
Constant 0.376*** 0.438***
(0.020) (0.013)
N 33 33
R2 0.524 0.526
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Table 5
Diversifying Mergers & Acquisitions - deal composition - and external market conditions.
This table estimates the relationship between the probability of engaging in a diversifying M&A and TED spread. Panel A contains
the coefficients from estimating the following logit regression on the sample of Individual M&A deals: Diversified M&Ait = α + β1 ·
TEDt + X
′
itγ + it. Where Diversified M&A is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Acquirer’s main 2 digit SIC industry
is different from the Target’s main 2 digit SIC industry, and zero otherwise. The matrix of controls X includes control for Deal Value
and Acquirer and Target Thomson firm controls in columns 3 to 6, while it includes Deal Value and Acquirer and Target Compustat
controls on columns 7 to 10. The Thomson controls are Sales, Profitability, Leverage and Cash for both the target and the acquirer. The
Compustat controls are Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage and Age for both the target and the acquirer. Panel B estimates the
same logit regression in a sample that excludes all deals where the target or acquirer is present in Compustat. All variables are defined in
the Appendix. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012, and its construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered by year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: All M&A Deals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Diversified M&A
TED 0.369*** 0.529*** 0.618*** 0.382** 0.509*** 0.470** 1.408*** 1.112** 1.096*** 1.162***
(0.084) (0.091) (0.190) (0.192) (0.186) (0.191) (0.297) (0.476) (0.363) (0.345)
Acq. Industry FE No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Tgt. Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,979 38,926 4,777 4,757 4,767 4,768 543 457 510 505
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.265 0.019 0.168 0.099 0.107 0.072 0.413 0.232 0.216
Panel B: M&A deals excluding Compustat targets and acquirers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diversified M&A
TED 0.165** 0.375*** 0.870*** 0.734*** 0.766*** 0.835**
(0.083) (0.103) (0.305) (0.280) (0.230) (0.337)
Acq. Industry FE No Yes No Yes Yes No
Tgt. Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 21,207 21,207 1565 1514 1548 1544
Pseudo R2 0.000 0.259 0.014 0.176 0.088 0.115
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Table 6
Correlations between acquirer and target cashflows & investment in diversifying M&As and external market conditions.
This table estimates the relationship between the correlation of investment, cash flows, cash flows minus investment
and net financing deficit and TED spread. Panel A contains the coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression
on the Aggregate M&A sample: Yit = α + β1 · TEDt + it. Where Y is Aggregate Investment Correlation in M&As in
column 1, Aggregate CF Correlation in M&As in column 2, Aggregate (CF - Investment) Correlation in M&As in column
3 and Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation in M&As in column 4. Panels B, C, D and E contain the coefficients from
estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of Individual M&A deals: Yit = α + β1 · TEDt + X ′itγ + it. Where
Y is Investment Correlation Acquirer – Target in Panel B, CF Correlation Acquirer – Target in Panel C, (CF - Investment)
Correlation Acquirer – Target in Panel D and Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target in Panel E. The Thomson
controls include Deal Value and Sales, Profitability, Leverage and Cash for both the target and the acquirer. The Compustat
controls include Deal Value and Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage and Age for both the target and the acquirer. All
variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012, and its construction is detailed in the data
section of the paper. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is
market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: Aggregate correlations between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate Investment Aggregate CF Aggregate (CF - Investment) Aggregate Financing
Correlation in M&As Correlation in M&As Correlation in M&As Deficit Correlation in M&As
TED -0.127*** -0.183*** -0.189*** -0.150***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.031) (0.016)
Constant 0.767*** 0.673*** 0.689*** 0.825***
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.010)
N 33 33 33 33
R2 0.516 0.554 0.552 0.737
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Table 6
Continued.
Panel B: Correlation of investment between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Investment Correlation Acquirer – Target
TED -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.111*** -0.049* -0.076** -0.070*** -0.163*** -0.121* -0.131** -0.103**
(0.016) (0.012) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.044) (0.066) (0.053) (0.043)
Acq. Industry FE No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Tgt. Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,918 38,918 4,769 4,769 4,769 4,769 542 542 542 542
R2 0.001 0.426 0.022 0.303 0.219 0.179 0.058 0.480 0.325 0.292
Panel C: Correlation of cash flows between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CF Correlation Acquirer – Target
TED -0.107*** -0.098*** -0.167*** -0.111*** -0.146*** -0.126*** -0.280*** -0.115* -0.167** -0.154**
(0.022) (0.017) (0.047) (0.034) (0.041) (0.038) (0.073) (0.067) (0.070) (0.058)
Acq. Industry FE No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Tgt. Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,918 38,918 4,769 4,769 4,769 4,769 542 542 542 542
R2 0.004 0.343 0.031 0.219 0.131 0.151 0.067 0.609 0.328 0.339
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Table 6
Continued.
Panel D: Correlation of cash flows minus investment between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(CF - Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Target
TED -0.098*** -0.096*** -0.168*** -0.111*** -0.146*** -0.128*** -0.274*** -0.094 -0.132* -0.142**
(0.020) (0.016) (0.049) (0.035) (0.041) (0.040) (0.065) (0.069) (0.067) (0.062)
Acq. Industry FE No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Tgt. Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,918 38,918 4,769 4,769 4,769 4,769 542 542 542 542
R2 0.004 0.346 0.033 0.233 0.142 0.159 0.072 0.611 0.335 0.327
Panel E: Correlation of financing deficit between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target
TED -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.071** -0.053** -0.073*** -0.062** -0.179*** -0.088* -0.101** -0.114***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.030) (0.045) (0.038) (0.029)
Acq. Industry FE No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Tgt. Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,918 38,918 4,769 4,769 4,769 4,769 542 542 542 542
R2 0.005 0.263 0.020 0.229 0.126 0.157 0.056 0.655 0.304 0.388
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Table 7
Choice of deal compensation in diversifying M&As & external market conditions.
This table estimates the relationship between means of payment in M&A deals and external financial frictions. Panel A contains the
coefficients from the following OLS regression on the aggregate M&A sample: Yit = α+ β1 · TEDt + it. Where Y is Aggregate % Cash in
column 1, Aggregate Use Cash in column 2 and Aggregate All Cash in column 3. The first two columns of Panel B (columns 4 and 5) contains
the coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of Individual M&A deals: % Cashit = α+β1 ·TEDt+X ′itγ+it.
Columns 6 to 9 of the table contain the coefficients from estimating the following logit regression on the sample of Individual M&A deals:
Yit = α+ β1 · TEDt +X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Use Cash in columns 6 and 7 and All Cash dummy in columns 8 and 9. For the regressions
in Panel B, the matrix of controls X includes control for Deal Value and Acquirer and Target firm controls constructed using Compustat.
These controls are Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage, and Age and are included in columns 5, 7 and 9. All variables are defined in
the Appendix. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012, and its construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered by year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: Aggregate M&A Deals Panel B: Individual M&A Deals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Aggregate Aggregate Aggregate
% Cash Use Cash All Cash % Cash Use Cash All Cash
TED -0.241** -0.354*** -0.158** -0.325*** -0.261*** -2.019*** -1.788*** -1.289*** -1.815***
(0.097) (0.108) (0.074) (0.074) (0.063) (0.565) (0.617) (0.484) (0.662)
Constant 0.528*** 0.703*** 0.357*** 0.568*** 0.669*** 1.009*** 1.436** -0.257 0.523
(0.062) (0.069) (0.048) (0.038) (0.094) (0.213) (0.592) (0.173) (0.656)
Compustat Controls No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 33 33 33 29,182 523 29,182 523 29,182 523
R2 0.167 0.257 0.128 0.048 0.157
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.101 0.020 0.172
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Table 8
Persistence in firm diversification decisions.
This table estimates the regressions that assess the persistence of organizational form. Panel A
contains the coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of Compustat
Segments firms: Yit = α + β1 · TEDt + β2 · Y i(t−1) + X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Number Divisions
for columns 1, 1-HHI Assets for columns 2 and 1-HHI Sales in columns 3. The matrix of controls
X includes Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage, and Age. Panel B contains the coefficients
obtained by estimating the following panel VAR model on the sample of Compustat Segments firms:
Y it = α1 + β1 · Y i,t−1 + β2 · TED i,t−1 + it
TED it = α2 + β3 · Y i,t−1 + β4 · TED i,t−1 + it
Where Y is Number Divisions in columns 1 and 2, 1-HHI Assets in columns 3 and 4 and 1-HHI
Sales in columns 5 and 6. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample covers the period
1980 to 2012, and its construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The standard errors
are in parenthesis and are clustered by year in Panel A. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: Firm scope and external market conditions
(1) (2) (3)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
TED 0.064*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag Number Divisions 0.831***
(0.009)
Lag 1-HHI Assets 0.834***
(0.009)
Lag 1-HHI Sales 0.774***
(0.009)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 120,142 120,142 120,142
R2 0.720 0.681 0.615
Panel B: Panel VAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number 1-HHI 1-HHI
Divisions TED Assets TED Sales TED
Lag TED 0.0272*** 0.818*** 0.0071*** 0.8114*** 0.0077*** 0.811***
(0.004) (0.0023) (0.001) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0023)
Lag Number Divisions 0.6918*** -0.0296***
(.0117) (0.00198)
Lag 1-HHI Assets 0.6756*** -0.018***
(0.0096) (0.0066)
Lag 1-HHI Sales 0.558*** -0.0146***
(0.0109) (0.0046)
N 91,867 91,867 91,867 91,867 91,867 91,867
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Table 9
Evolution of firm diversification and external market conditions - evidence from bank branch
deregulation.
This table shows the relationship between firm scope and external financial frictions. We
report coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of Compustat
Segments firms: Yit = α+ β1 · Deregulation Index ts +X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Number Divisions
in columns 1 and 2, 1-HHI Assets in columns 3 and 4 and 1-HHI Sales in columns 5 and 6.
Deregulation Index is an index that takes into account whether the state of the firm is deregulated
in terms of within state banking M&A, unrestricted de novo branching and allowing multibank
holding companies. The matrix of controls X includes Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage,
and Age. The sample used to perform the estimation covers the period 1980 to 1999. All variables
are defined in the Appendix. The sample construction is detailed in the data section of the paper.
The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state×year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
Deregulation Index -0.016*** -0.011** -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
R2 0.141 0.718 0.128 0.733 0.078 0.714
59
Table 10
Diversification using cashflows & investment correlations and external market conditions - evidence from bank branch dereg-
ulation.
This table estimates the relationship between the degree of diversification of firms measured by the correlation among
divisions of conglomerates and external financial frictions. We report coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression
on the sample of Compustat Segments’ firms: Yit = α+ β1 ·Deregulation Index ts +X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Firm Investment
Correlation for columns 1 and 2, Firm CF Correlation for columns 3 and 4, Firm (CF - Investment) Correlation for columns
5 and 6 and Firm Financing Deficit Correlation in columns 7 and 8. Deregulation Index is an index that takes into account
whether the state of the firm is deregulated in terms of within state banking M&A, unrestricted de novo branching and
allowing multibank holding companies. The matrix of controls X includes Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage, and
Age. The sample used to perform the estimation covers the period 1980 to 1999. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
The sample construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by
state×year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Investment Firm CF Firm (CF - Investment) Firm Financing
Correlation Correlation Correlation Deficit Correlation
Deregulation Index 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885 55,885
R2 0.149 0.799 0.169 0.797 0.171 0.796 0.147 0.791
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Table 11
Diversifying Mergers & Acquisitions - deal composition - and external market conditions - evidence from bank branch
deregulation.
This table estimates the relationship between the probability of engaging in a diversifying M&A and external
financial frictions. We report the coefficients from estimating the following logit regression on the sample of Individual
M&A deals: Diversified M&Ait = α+β1 ·Deregulation Index Acq.ts+X ′itγ+it. Where Diversified M&A is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the Acquirer’s main 2 digit SIC industry is different from the Target’s main 2
digit SIC industry, and zero otherwise. The matrix of controls X includes control for Deal Value and Acquirer and
Target Thomson firm controls in columns 4 to 6, while it includes Deal Value and acquirer and target Compustat
controls on columns 7 and 8. The Thomson controls are Sales, Profitability, Leverage and Cash for both the target
and the acquirer. The Compustat controls are Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage and Age for both the target
and the acquirer. Deregulation Index Acq. is an index that takes into account whether the state of the acquiring
firm is deregulated in terms of within state banking M&A, unrestricted de novo branching and allowing multibank
holding companies. The sample used to perform the estimation covers the period 1980 to 1999. All variables are
defined in the Appendix. The sample construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The standard errors
in parenthesis are clustered by acquirer’s state×year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with ***,
** and * respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Diversified M&A
Deregulation Index Acq. -0.047 -0.118** -0.113** -0.484*** -0.482** -0.500** -0.026 -1.168**
(0.047) (0.053) (0.050) (0.181) (0.201) (0.219) (0.350) (0.588)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirer State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Tgt. Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No
Thomson Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
N 21,594 21,580 21,543 2,310 2,299 2,259 290 251
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.201 0.279 0.056 0.121 0.224 0.212 0.330
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Table 12
Correlations between acquirer and target cashflows & investment in diversifying M&As and external market
conditions - evidence from bank branch deregulation.
This table estimates the relationship between the correlation of investment, cash flows, cash flows minus
investment and net financing deficit and external financial frictions. Panels A, B, C and D contain the
coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of Individual M&A deals: Yit =
α + β1 · Deregulation Index Acq.ts + X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Investment Correlation Acquirer – Target in
Panel A, CF Correlation Acquirer – Target in Panel B, (CF - Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Target in
Panel C and Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target in Panel D. The Thomson controls are Deal
Value and Sales, Profitability, Leverage and Cash for both the target and the acquirer. The Compustat
controls are Deal Value and Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage and Age for both the target and the
acquirer. Deregulation Index Acq. is an index that takes into account whether the state of the acquiring firm
is deregulated in terms of within state banking M&A, unrestricted de novo branching and allowing multibank
holding companies. The sample used to perform the estimation covers the period 1980 to 1999. All variables
are defined in the Appendix. The sample construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The
standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by acquirer’s state×year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and
10% is market with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: Correlation of investment between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Investment Correlation Acquirer – Target
Deregulation Index Acq. 0.004 0.012* 0.047 0.079** 0.066** 0.047 0.042 0.092
(0.008) (0.007) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.060) (0.068)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Tgt. Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
N 21,576 21,576 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 337 337
R2 0.043 0.303 0.342 0.069 0.221 0.342 0.298 0.528
Panel B: Correlation of cash flows between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CF Correlation Acquirer – Target
Deregulation Index Acq. 0.007 0.015 0.045 0.072* 0.060 0.045 -0.026 0.117
(0.010) (0.009) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.071) (0.087)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Tgt. Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
N 21,576 21,576 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 337 337
R2 0.058 0.255 0.310 0.086 0.172 0.310 0.309 0.511
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Table 12
Continued.
Panel C: Correlation of cash flows minus investment between acquirer and target
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(CF - Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Target
Deregulation Index Acq. 0.003 0.011 0.048 0.073* 0.061 0.048 -0.052 0.107
(0.010) (0.009) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036) (0.076) (0.093)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Tgt. Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
N 21,576 21,576 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 337 337
R2 0.055 0.256 0.315 0.089 0.178 0.315 0.300 0.522
Panel D: Correlation of financing deficit between acquirer andtTarget
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target
Deregulation Index Acq. 0.004 0.009 0.052** 0.057** 0.049** 0.052** 0.019 0.074
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.046) (0.048)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acq. Industry FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Tgt. Industry FE No No Yes No No Yes No No
Thomson Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Compustat Controls No No No No No No Yes Yes
N 21,576 21,576 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 337 337
R2 0.049 0.179 0.324 0.070 0.165 0.324 0.270 0.520
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Table 13
Evolution of firm diversification and external market conditions - heterogeneity of effects.
This table estimates how the sensitivity of organizational form to external financial conditions depends on industry sensitivity to
TED and industry volatility. In Panels A and B we report coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample
of Compustat Segments firms: Yit = α + β1 · TEDt + β2 · TEDt × Sensitivity to TED it + β3 · Sensitivity to TED it + X ′itγ + it. In
Panels C and D we report coefficients from estimating the following OLS regression on the sample of Compustat Segments firms:
Yit = α + β1 · TEDt + β2 · TEDt × Firm Volatilityit + β3 · Firm Volatilityit + X ′itγ + it. In Panels A and C Y is Number Divisions
in columns 1 and 2, 1-HHI Assets in columns 3 and 4 and 1-HHI Sales in columns 5 and 6. In Panels B and D Y is Firm Investment
Correlation in columns 1 and 2, Firm CF Correlation in columns 3 and 4, Firm (CF - Investment) Correlation in columns 5 and 6 and
Firm Financing Deficit Correlation in columns 7 and 8. The matrix of controls X includes Lag Size, Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage,
and Age. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012, and its construction is detailed in the
data section of the paper. The standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market
with ***, ** and * respectively.
Panel A: firm diversification and external market conditions - sensitivity to TED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
Sensitivity to TED×TED 1.444*** 0.848*** 0.293*** 0.110*** 0.414*** 0.147***
(0.363) (0.166) (0.088) (0.032) (0.106) (0.035)
TED 0.942*** 0.491*** 0.201*** 0.077*** 0.233*** 0.088***
(0.165) (0.081) (0.041) (0.015) (0.048) (0.016)
Sensitivity to TED -0.381*** -0.322** -0.063** 0.015 -0.259*** -0.057
(0.126) (0.133) (0.030) (0.032) (0.047) (0.036)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 119,088 119,088 119,088 119,088 119,088 119,088
R2 0.120 0.680 0.105 0.653 0.062 0.667
Panel B: Diversification using cashflows & investment correlations and external market conditions - sensitivity to TED
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Investment Firm CF Firm (CF - Investment) Firm Financing
Correlation Correlation Correlation Deficit Correlation
Sensitivity to TED×TED -0.207*** -0.100*** -0.306*** -0.136*** -0.303*** -0.134*** -0.160*** -0.104***
(0.050) (0.015) (0.083) (0.024) (0.081) (0.024) (0.008) (0.013)
TED -0.145*** -0.058*** -0.205*** -0.078*** -0.205*** -0.077*** -0.113*** -0.057***
(0.023) (0.008) (0.038) (0.012) (0.037) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007)
Sensitivity to TED 0.050*** 0.045** 0.103*** 0.047** 0.096*** 0.044** -0.025*** 0.062***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.029) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.008) (0.017)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 110,274 110,274 110,274 110,274 110,274 110,274 110,274 110,274
R2 0.138 0.773 0.163 0.769 0.164 0.768 0.134 0.769
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Table 13
Continued.
Panel C: Firm diversification and external market conditions - industry volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
Firm Volatility×TED 0.140*** 0.229*** 0.022* 0.037*** 0.071*** 0.036***
(0.050) (0.041) (0.012) (0.008) (0.018) (0.008)
TED 0.175*** -0.066 0.049*** -0.001 -0.009 -0.006
(0.054) (0.042) (0.012) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007)
Firm Volatility 0.076*** 0.256*** 0.024*** 0.045*** -0.067*** 0.054***
(0.021) (0.078) (0.006) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 120,142 120,142 120,142 120,142 120,142 120,142
R2 0.105 0.677 0.095 0.652 0.056 0.666
Panel D: Diversification using cashflows & investment correlations and external market conditions - industry volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Investment Firm CF Firm (CF - Investment) Firm Financing
Correlation Correlation Correlation Deficit Correlation
Firm Volatility×TED -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.033*** -0.047*** -0.036*** -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
TED -0.010 0.020*** -0.039*** 0.020*** -0.036*** 0.024*** -0.003 0.017***
(0.007) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Firm Volatility -0.028*** -0.014 -0.022*** -0.007 -0.025*** -0.011 -0.024*** -0.009
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328 111,328
R2 0.130 0.770 0.149 0.766 0.150 0.765 0.120 0.767
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Table 14
Firm diversification and external market conditions: interaction with corporate governance.
This table estimates how the sensitivity of organizational form to external financial conditions
depends on firm’s corporate governance quality. We report coefficients from estimating the following
OLS regression on the sample of Compustat Segments’ firms: Yit = α+ β1 · TEDt + β2E Index it +
β3E Index it × TEDt +X ′itγ + it. Where Y is Number Divisions in columns 1 and 2, 1-HHI Assets
in columns 3 and 4 and 1-HHI Sales in columns 5 and 6. The matrix of controls X includes Lag Size,
Lag CF/A, Lag Q, Lag Leverage, and Age. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The sample
construction is detailed in the data section of the paper. The sample includes data from 1990, 1993,
1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, when the variable E Index is available. The standard
errors in parenthesis are clustered by year. Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% is market with
***, ** and * respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number Divisions 1-HHI Assets 1-HHI Sales
E Index × TED -0.154** -0.127** -0.038** -0.037** -0.045*** -0.036**
(0.059) (0.048) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
TED 0.255*** 0.205** 0.075*** 0.077** 0.090*** 0.066**
(0.078) (0.071) (0.017) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022)
E Index 0.078*** 0.062** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.011***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243 5,243
R2 0.122 0.737 0.105 0.732 0.102 0.763
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Fig. 1. Corporate diversification and external market conditions. This figure presents the relationship between the
Avg. Number of Divisions in Compustat and Avg. 1-HHI Assets in Compustat of Compustat Segments firms and
the degree of external financial frictions measured by TED. Panel A of the figure shows the evolution of TED and
the asset weighted average of Number Divisions of Compustat Segements firms. Panel B presents the evolution of
TED and the assets weighted average of 1-HHI Assets of Compustat Segments firms. The figure is constructed using
the Compustat Segments sample as described in the data section of the paper. The sample covers the period 1980 to
2012. The variables construction and definitions are detailed in the Appendix.
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Panel C: Avg. (CF - Investment) Correlation in
Compustat and TED.
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Panel D: Avg. Financing Deficit Correlation in
Compustat and TED.
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Fig. 2. Cashflows & investment correlation across divisions and external market conditions. This figure presents
the relationship between Avg. Investment Correlation in Compustat, Avg. CF Correlation in Compustat, Avg. (CF -
Investment) Correlation in Compustat and Avg. Financing Deficit Correlation in Compustat of the different divisions
of Compustat Segments firms and the degree of external financial frictions. Panel A depicts the scatter plot of TED
and Avg. Investment Correlation in Compustat. Panel B depicts the scatter plot of TED and Avg. CF Correlation in
Compustat. Panel C depicts the scatter plot of TED and Avg. (CF - Investment) Correlation in Compustat. Panel
D depicts the scatter plot of TED and Avg. Financing Deficit Correlation in Compustat. The figure is constructed
using the Compustat Segments sample as described in the data section of the paper. The sample covers the period
1980 to 2012. The variables construction and definitions are detailed in the Appendix.
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Panel A: Share of Value of Diversified Deals and
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Panel B: Share of Number of Diversified Deals
and TED.
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Fig. 3. Share of diversified deals and external market conditions. This figure presents the relationship between the
share of diversifying M&A deals and external market conditions. Panel A of the figure shows the evolution of TED
and the share of diversifying M&As weighted by deal size. Panel B presents the evolution of TED and the share
of number of diversifying M&As. The figure is constructed using the Aggregate M&A sample as described in the
data section of the paper. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012. The variables construction and definitions are
detailed in the Appendix.
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Panel A: Aggregate Investment Correlation in
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Panel B: Aggregate CF Correlation in M&As and
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Panel C: Aggregate (CF - Investment)
Correlation in M&As and TED
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Panel D: Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation
in M&As and TED
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Fig. 4. Correlation of cashflows & investments between M&A target and acquirer and external market conditions.
This figure presents the relationship between Aggregate Investment Correlation in M&As, Aggregate CF Correlation
in M&As, Aggregate (CF - Investment) Correlation in M&As and Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation in M&As
of Acquirer and Taget and external market conditions. Panel A depicts the scatter plot of TED and Aggregate
Investment Correlation in M&As. Panel B depicts the scatter plot of TED and Aggregate CF Correlation in M&As.
Panel C depicts the scatter plot of TED and Aggregate (CF - Investment) Correlation in M&As. Panel D depicts
the scatter plot of TED and Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation in M&As. The figure is constructed using the
Aggregate M&A sample as described in the data section of the paper. The sample covers the period 1980 to 2012.
The variables construction and definitions are detailed in the Appendix.
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Variable Definitions Appendix
Independent Variables of Interest
TED Spread – The difference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term
U.S. government T-bills.
TED – The 3 year moving average of TED Spread. It is constructed as: TED t =
TED Spreadt−1+TED Spreadt+TED Spreadt+1
3 .
Deregulation Index – This variable captures the evolution of the intrastate bank branch
deregulation as a measure of external financial frictions. It is defined as the sum of the ways in
which banks can expand their operations in terms of: (i) permitting the formation of multibank
holding companies; (ii) permitting branching by means of merger and acquisitions (M&As)
only, and (iii) permitting unrestricted (de novo) branching. The index varies by state–year
and can range from 0 to 3. This variable is used in the Compustat Segments sample where
state is assigned using the location of firms’ headquarters.
Deregulation Index Acq. – This variable captures the evolution of the intrastate bank
branch deregulation as a measure of external financial frictions faced by acquiring firms in M&A
transactions. It is defined as the sum of the ways in which banks can expand their operations
in the state of the acquiring firm in terms of: (i) permitting the formation of multibank holding
companies; (ii) permitting branching by means of merger and acquisitions (M&As) only, and
(iii) permitting unrestricted (de novo) branching. The index varies by state–year and can range
from 0 to 3.
Variables Used in Both Compustat Segments and M&A Analysis
Investment Correlation – This variable measures the correlation in Investment between
every pair of two digit SIC industries over the period 1980-2012. To construct this variable we
first calculate the average Investment of stand alone firms by year and two digit SIC industry.
A firm is classified as stand alone if operates in a single 2 digit SIC industry. Investment is
defined as Capital Expenditures/Total Assets (Compustat items capx and at). We then use the
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full sample period (1980-2012) to calculate the correlation of the average industry Investment
for every pair of 2 digit SIC industries. This variable is not used directly in the analysis,
we use it as an intermediate step to construct measures of investment correlation for both
Compustat Segments firms and M&A deals. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments
and Compustat North America.
CF Correlation – This variable measures the correlation in Cash Flows between every
pair of two digit SIC industries over the period 1980-2012. To construct this variable we first
calculate the average Cash Flow of stand alone firms by year and two digit SIC industry. A
firm is classified as stand alone if operates in a single 2 digit SIC industry. Cash Flow is
defined as Common Shares Used to Calculate Earnings Per Share (Compustat item cshpri)
times Earnings Per Share (Basic) - Excluding Extraordinary Items (Compustat item epspx)
plus Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item dp) divided by total assets (Compustat
item at). We then use the full sample period (1980-2012) to calculate the correlation of the
average industry Cash Flows for every pair of 2 digit SIC industries. This variable is not used
directly in the analysis, we use it as an intermediate step to construct measures of cash flow
correlation for both Compustat Segments firms and M&A deals. Data sources: Compustat
Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
(CF - Investment) Correlation – This variable measures the correlation in Cash Flows
minus Investment between every pair of two digit SIC industries over the period 1980-2012.
To construct this variable we first calculate the average Cash Flow minus Investment of stand
alone firms by year and two digit SIC industry. A firm is classified as stand alone if operates
in a single 2 digit SIC industry. Cash Flows are defined as Common Shares Used to Calculate
Earnings Per Share (Compustat item cshpri) times Earnings Per Share (Basic) - Excluding
Extraordinary Items (Compustat item epspx) plus Depreciation and Amortization (Compus-
tat item dp) divided by total assets (Compustat item at). Investment is defined as Capital
Expenditures/Total Assets (Compustat items capx at). We then use the full sample period
(1980-2012) to calculate the correlation of the average industry Cash Flow minus Investment
for every pair of 2 digit SIC industries. This variable is not used directly in the analysis, we
use it as an intermediate step to construct measures of cash flow minus investment correlation
for both Compustat Segments firms and M&A deals. Data sources: Compustat Historical
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Segments and Compustat North America.
Financing Deficit Correlation – This variable measures the correlation in net financing
deficit between every pair of two digit SIC industries over the period 1980-2012. To construct
this variable we first calculate the average net financing deficit of stand alone firms by year
and two digit SIC industry. A firm is classified as stand alone if operates in a single 2 digit
SIC industry. Net financing deficit is defined as in Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011). We
then use the full sample period (1980-2012) to calculate the correlation of the average industry
net financing deficit for every pair of 2 digit SIC industries. This variable is not used directly
in the analysis, we use it as an intermediate step to construct measures of financing deficit
correlation for both Compustat Segments firms and M&A deals. Data sources: Compustat
Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Industry Sensitivity to TED – This variable measures the sensitivity of each 2 digit
SIC industry to TED. To construct this variable we first calculate the average sales of stand
alone firms by year and two digit SIC industry. A firm is classified as stand alone if operates
in a single 2 digit SIC industry. We then calculate the correlation between average industry
sales and TED for our sample period (1980-2012) by 2 digit SIC industry. This variable is not
used directly in the analysis, we use it as an intermediate step to construct variables used in
the analysis of Compustat Segments firms and M&A deals.
Industry Volatility – This variable measures the volatility of each 2 digit SIC industry.
To construct this variable we first calculate the average sales of stand alone firms by year and
two digit SIC industry. A firm is classified as stand alone if operates in a single 2 digit SIC
industry. We then calculate the standard deviation of average sales over our sample period
(1980-2012) by 2 digit SIC industry. This variable is not used directly in the analysis, we use
it as an intermediate step to construct variables used in the analysis of Compustat Segments
firms and M&A deals.
Compustat Segments Variables
Compustat Segments Dependent Variables
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Number Divisions – The number of 2 digit SIC divisions the firm operates in. Data
sources: Compustat Historical Segments.
1-HHI Assets – This variable is defined as one minus the Herfindhal-Hirshman Index of
division assets defined as: HHI Assetsft =
∑
j∈Jft(
Ajft∑
j∈Jft Ajft
)2. Where Ajft represents the
assets of division j of firm f at time t and Jft is the set of divisions of firm f at time t. Data
sources: Compustat Historical Segments.
1-HHI Sales – This variable is defined as one minus the Herfindhal-Hirshman Index of
division sales of the firm defined as: HHI Salesft =
∑
j∈Jft(
Salesjft∑
j∈Jft Salesjft
)2. Where Salesjft
represents the sales of division j of firm f at time t and Jft is the set of divisions of firm f at
time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments.
Firm Investment Correlation – Defined for firm f with multiple 2 digit SIC divisions
j ∈ Jft at time t as: Firm Investment Correlationft =
∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)×Investment Correlationlj∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)
,
where Ajft denotes the assets of division j of firm f at time t and Alft are the assets of division
l of firm f at time t. Investment Correlation lj is the Investment Correlation between divisions
l and j as defined above, and [Ω]2ft is the set that contains all possible pairs of divisions lj
of firm f at time t (for example if the firm operates in 4 divisions there are 6 division pairs).
This variable takes the value of 1 for firms with only one 2 digit SIC division. Data sources:
Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Firm CF Correlation – Defined for firm f with multiple 2 digit SIC divisions j ∈ Jft
at time t as: Firm CF Correlationft =
∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)×CF Correlationjl∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)
, where Ajft denotes
the assets of division j of firm f at time t and Alft are the assets of division l of firm f at
time t. CF Correlation lj is the CF Correlation between divisions l and j as defined above, and
[Ω]2ft is the set that contains all possible pairs of divisions lj of firm f at time t. Data sources:
Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Firm (CF - Investment) Correlation – Defined for firm f with multiple 2 digit SIC
divisions j ∈ Jft at time t as:
Firm CF - Investment Correlationft =
∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)×(CF - Investment) Correlationlj∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)
,
where Ajft denotes the assets of division j of firm f at time t and Alft are the assets of division
l of firm f at time t. (CF - Investment) Correlation lj is the (CF–Investment) Correlation
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between divisions l and j as defined above, and [Ω]2ft is the set that contains all possible
pairs of divisions lj of firm f at time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and
Compustat North America.
Firm Financing Deficit Correlation – Defined for firm f with multiple 2 digit SIC
divisions j ∈ Jft at time t as:
Firm Financing Deficit Correlationft =
∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)×Financing Deficit Correlationlj∑
jl∈[Ω]2
ft
(Ajft+Alft)
,
where Ajft denotes the assets of division j of firm f at time t and Alft are the assets of division
l of firm f at time t. Financing Deficit Correlation lj is the Financing Deficit Correlation
between divisions l and j as defined above, and [Ω]2ft is the set that contains all possible
pairs of divisions lj of firm f at time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and
Compustat North America.
Avg. Number Divisions in Compustat – The asset weighted average of Number Divi-
sions by year. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Avg. 1-HHI Assets in Compustat – The asset weighted average of 1-HHI Assets by
year. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Avg. 1-HHI Sales in Compustat – The asset weighted average of 1-HHI Sales by year.
Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Avg. Investment Correlation in Compustat – The asset weighted average of Firm
Investment Correlation by year. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat
North America.
Avg. CF Correlation in Compustat – The asset weighted average of Firm CF Corre-
lation by year. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
Avg. (CF - Investment) Correlation in Compustat – The asset weighted average of
Firm (CF - Investment) Correlation by year. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments
and Compustat North America.
Avg. Financing Deficit Correlation in Compustat – The asset weighted average of
Firm Financing Deficit Correlation by year. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments
and Compustat North America.
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Compustat Segments Control Variables
Lag Size – Lagged log of total assets (Compustat item at). Winsorized at the 1% and
99% level. Data source: Compustat North America.
Lag CF/A – This variable is defined as Common Shares Used to Calculate Earnings Per
Share (Compustat item cshpri) times Earnings Per Share (Basic) - Excluding Extraordinary
Items (Compustat item epspx) plus Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item dp) di-
vided by total assets (Compustat item at). Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source:
Compustat North America.
Lag Q – Market Value of Assets / Book Value of Assets. Market Value of Assets is defined
as Book Value of Assets (Compustat item at) plus Market Value of Equity minus Book Value of
Equity. Market Value of Equity is total shares outstanding times Price per Share (Compustat
items csho and prcc f). Book Value of Equity is the Total Stockholders Equity minus Liquidat-
ing Value of Preferred Stock (Compustat items teq and pstkl). If Total Stockholders Equity is
not available we use Total Common/Ordinary Equity plus Preferred Stock at Carrying Value
(Compustat items ceq and upstk). If the sum of Total Common/Ordinary Equity and Pre-
ferred Stock at Carrying Value is also unavailable we use Total Assets minus Total Liabiilities
(Compustat items at and lt). If Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credit (Compustat item
txditc) is available we add it to Book Value of Equity and if Core Post Retirement Adjustment
(Compustat item prca) is available we subtract it from Book Value of Equity. Winsorized at
the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat North America.
Lag Leverage – Leverage is defined as Book Value of Debt divided by Market Value of
Assets. Book Value of Debt is defined as Book Value of Assets minus Book Value of Equity.
Book Value of Assets, Book Value of Equity and Market Value of Assets are defined as described
in the definition of Lag Q. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat North
America.
Age – This variable is defined as current year minus the first year in which the firm
appeared in Compustat North America. Data source: Compustat North America.
Sensitivity to TED – Defined for firm f with multiple 2 digit SIC divisions j ∈ Jft
at time t as: Sensitivity to TEDft =
∑
j∈Jft Ajft×Industry Sensitivity to TEDj∑
j∈Jft Ajft
, where Ajft denotes
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the assets of division j of firm f at time t. Industry Sensitivity to TEDj is the Industry
Sensitivity to TED of industry j as defined above, and Jft is the set that contains all divisions
j of firm f at time t. For firms with a single division j at time t this variable is defined
as Sensitivity to TEDft = Industry Sensitivity to TEDj . Data sources: Compustat Historical
Segments and Compustat North America.
Firm Volatility – Defined for firm f with multiple 2 digit SIC divisions j ∈ Jft at time t
as: Firm Volatilityft =
∑
j∈Jft Ajft×Industry Volatilityj∑
j∈Jft Ajft
, where Ajft denotes the assets of division
j of firm f at time t. Industry Volatilityj is the Industry Volatility of industry j as defined
above, and Jft is the set that contains all divisions j of firm f at time t. For firms with a
single division j at time t this variable is defined as Firm Volatilityft = Industry Volatilityj .
Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments and Compustat North America.
E Index – This variable is the entrenchment index as defined in Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2009). Source: Lucian Bebchuk’s website (www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk).
M&A Variables
M&A Dependent Variables
Diversified M&A – Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer’s main 2
digit SIC is different from the target’s main 2 digit SIC. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Investment Correlation Acquirer – Target – This variable is defined as the Investment
Correlation between the main 2-digit SIC industries of the Acquirer and Target firms involved
in the M&A transaction.
CF Correlation Acquirer – Target – This variable is defined as the CF Correlation
between the main 2-digit SIC industries of the Acquirer and Target firms involved in the M&A
transaction.
(CF - Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Target – This variable is defined as the
(CF - Investment) Correlation between the main 2-digit SIC industries of the Acquirer and
Target firms involved in the M&A transaction.
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Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target – This variable is defined as the
Financing Deficit Correlation between the main 2-digit SIC industries of the Acquirer and
Target firms involved in the M&A transaction.
Share Diversified Value – Share of all M&A deals that are diversifying weighted by deal
value. It is defined as Share Diversified Valuet =
∑
i Diversified M&Ait×Deal Valueit∑
Deal Valueit
. A diversifying
deal is defined as the target and the acquirer having different main 2 digit SIC codes. Data
source: Thomson ONE.
Share Diversified Deals – Share of all M&A deals that are diversifying. It is defined as
Share Diversified Dealst =
∑
i Diversified M&Ait
Total Number of Dealst
. A diversifying deal is defined as the target and
the acquirer having different main 2 digit SIC codes. The numerator, Total Number of Deals
is the total number of M&A deals in year t. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Aggregate Investment Correlation in M&As – Deal value weighted average of In-
vestment Correlation Acquirer – Target by year.
Aggregate Investment Correlation in M&Ast =
=
∑
i Investment Correlation Acquirer – Targetit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
,
where the sum is over all deals i at time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments,
Compustat North America and Thomson ONE
Aggregate CF Correlation in M&As – Deal value weighted average of CF Correlation
Acquirer – Target by year.
Aggregate CF Correlation in M&Ast =
∑
i CF Correlation Acquirer – Targetit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
, where the
sum is over all deals i at time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments, Compustat
North America and Thomson ONE.
Aggregate (CF - Investment) Correlation in M&As – Defined as the deal value
weighted average of (CF – Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Target by year.
Aggregate CF - Investment Correlation in M&Ast =
=
∑
i (CF - Investment) Correlation Acquirer – Targetit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
,
where the sum is over all deals i at time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments,
Compustat North America and Thomson ONE
79
Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation in M&As – Defined as the deal value
weighted average of Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Target by year.
Aggregate Financing Deficit Correlation in M&Ast =
=
∑
i Financing Deficit Correlation Acquirer – Targetit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
,
where the sum is over all deals i at time t. Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments,
Compustat North America and Thomson ONE
% Cash – Percentage of the deal that is paid for with cash. Data sources: Thomson ONE.
Use Cash – Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer uses cash to finance
the deal and zero otherwise. Data source: Thomson ONE.
All Cash – Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquirer uses only cash to
finance the deal and zero otherwise. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Aggregate % Cash – The value weighted percent of cash used as a means of payment
for deals. Aggregate % Casht =
∑
i % Cashit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
, where the sum is over all deals i. Data
source: Thomson ONE.
Aggregate Use Cash – The value weighted share of deals that use cash as a means of
payment. Aggregate Use Casht =
∑
i Use Cashit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
, where the sum is over all deals i.
Data source: Thomson ONE.
Aggregate All Cash – The value weighted share of deals that use all cash as a means
of payment. Aggregate All Casht =
∑
i All Cashit×Deal Valueit∑
i Deal Valueit
, where the sum is over all deals i.
Data source: Thomson ONE.
M&A Control Variables
Deal Value – The value of the transaction in 2009 $Millions. Data source: Thomson
ONE.
Sales Acq. – Log of Acquirer Net Sales (in $Millions). Acquirer Net Sales are defined as:
Primary source of revenue after taking into account returned goods and allowances for price
reductions for the last 12 months ending on the date of the most recent financial information
prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). If not available, total revenues are used.
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Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Profitability Acq. – Acquirer EBITDA/ Acquirer Net Sales. Where Acquirer Net Sales
are defined as: Primary source of revenue after taking into account returned goods and al-
lowances for price reductions for the last 12 months ending on the date of the most recent
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). If not available,
total revenues are used. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Leverage Acq. – Acquirer Net Debt/Acquirer Total Assets, where Acquiror Net Debt is
calculated by adding the acquiror’s straight debt, short-term debt, and preferred equity and
subtracting cash and marketable securities as of the date of the most recent financial infor-
mation prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). Acquiror Total Assets includes
current assets, long-term investments and funds, net fixed assets, tangible assets, and deferred
charges ($mil). Acquiror Total Assets equals total liabilities plus shareholders’ equity plus
minority interest. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Cash Acq. – Acquirer Cash and Marketable Securities/Acquirer Total Assets, where
Acquirer Cash and Marketable Securities is defined as cash and the temporary investment
vehicles for cash, including commercial paper and short-term government securities, as of the
date of the most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction
($mil). Acquirer Total Assets includes current assets, long-term investments and funds, net
fixed assets, tangible assets, and deferred charges ($mil). Acquirer Total Assets equals total
liabilities plus shareholders’ equity plus minority interest. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
Data source: Thomson ONE.
Sales Tgt. – Log of Target Net Sales (in $Millions). Target Net Sales are defined as:
Primary source of revenue after taking into account returned goods and allowances for price
reductions for the last 12 months ending on the date of the most recent financial information
prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). If not available, total revenues are used.
Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Profitability Tgt. – Target EBITDA/ Target Net Sales, where Target Net Sales are
defined as: Primary source of revenue after taking into account returned goods and allowances
for price reductions for the last 12 months ending on the date of the most recent financial
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information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). If not available, total revenues
are used. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Leverage Tgt. – Target Net Debt/Target Total Assets, where Target Net Debt is calcu-
lated by adding the target’s straight debt, short-term debt, and preferred equity and subtract-
ing cash and marketable securities as of the date of the most recent financial information prior
to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). Target Total Assets is defined as total balance
sheet assets including, current assets, long-term investments and funds, net fixed assets, intan-
gible assets, and deferred charges, as of the date of the most current financial information prior
to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). Target Total Assets equals total liabilities plus
shareholders’ equity plus minority interest. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source:
Thomson ONE.
Cash Tgt. – Target Cash and Marketable Securities/Target Total Assets, where Target
Cash and Marketable Securities is defined as cash and the temporary investment vehicles for
cash, including commercial paper and short-term government securities, as of the date of the
most current financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). For
banks, Cash does not include loans, but does include federal funds sold. Target Total Assets
is defined as total balance sheet assets including, current assets, long-term investments and
funds, net fixed assets, intangible assets, and deferred charges, as of the date of the most current
financial information prior to the announcement of the transaction ($mil). Target Total Assets
equals total liabilities plus shareholders’ equity plus minority interest. Winsorized at the 1%
and 99% level. Data source: Thomson ONE.
Lag Size Acq. – Lagged log of acquirer’s total assets (Compustat item at). Winsorized
at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat North America.
Lag CF/A Acq. – Acquirer’s Common Shares Used to Calculate Earnings Per Share
(Compustat item cshpri) times Earnings Per Share (Basic) - Excluding Extraordinary Items
(Compustat item epspx) plus Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item dp) divided
by total assets (Compustat item at). Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source:
Compustat North America.
Lag Q Acq. – Acquirer Market Value of Assets / Acquirer Book Value of Assets. Acquirer
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Market Value of Assets is Book Value of Assets (Compustat item at) plus Market Value of
Equity minus Book Value of Equity. Market Value of Equity is the total shares outstanding
times the Price per Share (Compustat items csho and prcc f). Book Value of Equity is Total
Stockholders Equity minus Liquidating Value of Preferred Stock (Compustat items teq and
pstkl). If Total Stockholders Equity is not available we use Total Common/Ordinary Equity
plus Preferred Stock at Carrying Value (Compustat items ceq and upstk). If the sum of Total
Common/Ordinary Equity and Preferred Stock at Carrying Value is also unavailable we use
Total Assets minus Total Liabiilities (Compustat items at and lt). If Deferred Taxes and
Investment Tax Credit (Compustat item txditc) is available we add it to Book Value of Equity
and if Core Post Retirement Adjustment (Compustat item prca) is available we subtract it
from Book Value of Equity. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat
North America.
Lag Leverage Acq. – Acquirer’s Book Value of Debt/Market Value of Assets. Book
Value of Debt is defined as Book Value of Assets minus Book Value of Equity. Book Value of
Assets, Book Value of Equity and Market Value of Assets are defined in the definition of Lag
Q Acq. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat North America.
Age Acq. – Current year minus the first year in which the firm appeared in Compustat.
Data source: Compustat North America.
Lag Size Tgt. – Lagged log of target’s total assets (Compustat item at). Winsorized at
the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat North America.
Lag CF/A Tgt. – Target’s Common Shares Used to Calculate Earnings Per Share (Com-
pustat item cshpri) times Earnings Per Share (Basic) - Excluding Extraordinary Items (Com-
pustat item epspx) plus Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item dp) divided by total
assets (Compustat item at). Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat
North America.
Lag Q Tgt. – Target Market Value of Assets / Target Book Value of Assets. Target Market
Value of Assets is Book Value of Assets (Compustat item at) plus Market Value of Equity minus
Book Value of Equity. Market Value of Equity is the product of total shares outstanding and
Price per Share (Compustat items csho and prcc f). Book Value of Equity is defined as Total
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Stockholders Equity minus Liquidating Value of Preferred Stock (Compustat items teq and
pstkl). If Total Stockholders Equity is not available we use Total Common/Ordinary Equity
plus Preferred Stock at Carrying Value (Compustat items ceq and upstk). If the sum of Total
Common/Ordinary Equity and Preferred Stock at Carrying Value is also unavailable we use
Total Assets minus Total Liabiilities (Compustat items at and lt). If Deferred Taxes and
Investment Tax Credit (Compustat item txditc) is available we add it to Book Value of Equity
and if Core Post Retirement Adjustment (Compustat item prca) is available we subtract it
from Book Value of Equity. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat
North America.
Lag Leverage Tgt. – Target’s Book Value of Debt/Market Value of Assets. Book Value
of Debt is defined as Book Value of Assets minus Book Value of Equity. Book Value of Assets,
Book Value of Equity and Market Value of Assets are defined as described in the definition of
Lag Q Tgt. Winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Data source: Compustat North America.
Age Tgt. – Current year minus the first year in which the firm appeared in Compustat.
Data source: Compustat North America.
Acq. Sensitivity to TED – Defined for M&A acquiring firm f with main 2 digit SIC
industry j at time t as: Acq. Sensitivity to TEDft = Industry Sensitivity to TEDj , where
Industry Sensitivity to TEDj is the Industry Sensitivity to TED of industry j as defined above.
Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments, Compustat North America and Thomson ONE.
Acq. Industry Volatility – Defined for M&A acquiring firm f with main 2 digit SIC in-
dustry j at time t as: Acq. Industry Volatilityft = Industry Volatilityj , where Industry Volatil-
ityj is the Industry Volatility of industry j as defined above. Data sources: Compustat His-
torical Segments, Compustat North America and Thomson ONE.
Tgt. Sensitivity to TED – Defined for M&A target firm f with main 2 digit SIC
industry j at time t as: Tgt. Sensitivity to TEDft = Industry Sensitivity to TEDj , where
Industry Sensitivity to TEDj is the Industry Sensitivity to TED of industry j as defined above.
Data sources: Compustat Historical Segments, Compustat North America and Thomson ONE.
Tgt. Industry Volatility – Defined for M&A target firm f with main 2 digit SIC industry
j at time t as: Tgt. Industry Volatilityft = Industry Volatilityj , where Industry Volatilityj is
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the Industry Volatility of industry j as defined above. Data sources: Compustat Historical
Segments, Compustat North America and Thomson ONE.
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